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1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petr, the City of Pawtucket, argues that the

inclusion of a nativity scene in their Christmas display does not

WA4-IZ~ ,_,fs ~ ~

violate the Establishment Clause.
2.

FACTS

&

DECISION BELOW:

Resg , several individuals and

filed suit in D.R.I. one ~~
~td--~~t"~~?
•

the Rhode Island affiliate of t

~~

~

Cl/7.1'

~

~~~
~'
dtrJnf

~
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A.4.lt.,

~~~
~~
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1eek before Christmas, 1980, seeking a temporary restraining
order requiring the immediate removal of the nativity scene
erected by the City of Pawtucket; resps alleged that the nativity
scene, or creche, violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.

Thereafter, resps withdrew their request for

immediate relief, allowing the creche to remain unchallenged for
the 1980 Christmas season, after agreement that the case would
proceed to trial on an accelerated schedule.
Each year the City of Pawtucket uses Hodgson Park, a
•

privately owned open space of approximately 40,000 square feet,
to erect a

-

Chr~tma; dis~laj·

The lighted display, built by City

employees and paid for by City funds, included in 1980, among

~ther

things,

a~ishing well,~~ta's

House (inhabited by a live
~

danta who distributed candy), ~rouping of caroler/musician

-

..,.

figures in old-fashioned dress surrounded by six large candles, a
0•village" composed of four houses and a church, four large fivepointed stars,~hree wooden Christmas tree cutouts, av'l.1ve 40 foot Christmas tree strung with lights, Santa's sleigh and
reindeer, a large wreath hung from candy-striped poles, large
letters spelling out "Season's Greetings," 21 cut-out characters
representing such varied characters as a clown, a dancing
elephant, a robot, and a teddy bear
issue in this case.

-

and the nativity scene at

The nativity scene was placed in "the

foreground of the display" in a space 10 feet by 14 feet and the
figures were "approximately life sized."
After the accumulation of a considerable amount of
testimony, the DC (Pettine) issued a 54-page opinion expressing

~~

- 3 ~ •is

decision that the creche violated the Establishment Clause.

The DC relied on the three-part test developed by this Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for determining whether a
statute violated the Establishment Clause.

In Lemon the court

said:
"First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; ••. finally, the statute
must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion." Id., at 612-613.
With respect to the first part of the test, the City
that the creche, when viewed as part of the whole display, served
an economical purpose in attracting shoppers to the area and
~erved

a cultural purpose in showing all aspects of the national

holiday of Christmas.

The DC rejected the alleged economical

purpose, relying on testimony that the Christmas display would
attract shoppers even without the nativity scene.

In response to

the cultural purpose, the DC concluded that, unlike the other
parts of the display, the nativity scene remains essentially a
religious symbol and to the extent it shows some history of
culture it reflects the religious nature of that culture; this,
found the DC, is not a secular purpose.

The DC then concluded

that since the City had not tried to disclaim the religious
nature of the creche or in any way minimize its religious
connotations it could only be found that the City had "tried to
endorse and promulgate religious beliefs by including a nativity
;cene in the display."

- 4 -

In response to the second part of the Lemon test, the DC
concluded that the nativity scene had the effect of advancing
religion.

The court relied on testimony that "people knew that

the ••• display was sponsored at least in part by the city" and
that "viewers would not regard the creche as an insignificant
part of the display."

Absent any evidence that the City had

tried to present the creche in a broad, neutral, educational
context, or "to shift the viewer's attention away from the
creche's religious message," the DC found that "despite its
passive nature, erection of the creche has the real and
substantial effect of affiliating the city with the Christian
beliefs that the creche represents."
The DC also found that the creche had caused excessive
government entanglement with religion.

As proof of this

entanglement, the DC relied on "the atmosphere •.. of anger,
hostility, name calling, political maneuvering, all prompted by
the fact that someone had questioned the city's ownership and
display of a religious symbol."
A

~ided

panel of the CA 1 affirmed.

DC's conclusions in applying the three part

The court adoptd the
Lemo~

test, even

though theCA thought the DC's basis for a finding of
entanglement might be suspect.

The CA then looked to this

Court's recent decision in Larson v. Valente,

---u.s.

(1982), and intimated that instead of applying the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test, the Court now sanctioned application of
:raditional "strict scrutiny" to these kinds of cases.

Then the

CA 1 found that since the DC had determined that the nativity

- 5 ~cene

did not further any legitimate secular purpose it obviously

was not in furtherance of a compelling state interest.

In

dissent, Judge Campbell reasoned that Christmas is now a secular
~

holiday and it makes no sense to require suppression of any
aspect of that holiday.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The City argues that this decision

conflicts with numerous state and federal decisions.

See, e.g.,

u.s.

O'Hair v. Clements, 638 F.2d 1231 (CA 5), cert. denied, 454
878 (1981)

~

Florey v. Sioux Falls School District, 619 F.2d 1311

(CA 8), cert. denied, 449
F.2d 65

(DC Cir. 1973)

F.2d 29

(CA 10

~nd

1973)~

u.s.

987 (1980)

~Anderson

~

Allen v. Morton, 495

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475

Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church

State v. City and County of Denver, 526 F.Supp. 1310 (D.

Colo. 1981)

(appeal pending in CA 10)

~

Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc.

v. City of Eugene_, 276 Ore. 1007 (1976), cert. denied, 438
878

(1977)~

denied, 409

u.s.

Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 476 P.2d 789 (Okla.), cert.

u.s.

980

(1972)~

Paul v. Dade County, 202 S.2d 833

(Fla. App.), aff'd., 207 S.2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1041 (1968).

The City contends that the DC went wrong in

applying the Lemon v. Kurtzman test by failing to give sufficient
consideration to the Christmas display as a whole, of which the
nativity scene was only a small part.

The City argues that the

purpose of this display was clearly not to advance religion, but
rather to show the various parts of what is now largely a secular
holiday.

The City also argues that when the display is viewed as

. whole it cannot be said that its "primary effect" is to advance
religion.

Finally, the City contends that the political debate

- 6 -

round by the DC surrounding the creche provides no basis for
excessive entanglement under the
claims that the CA

t

Lemo~

test.

The City further

1

acted erroneously in trying to "supplant the

tripartite test of Lemon with the strict scrutiny test" used by
the Court in Larson v. Valente.
In a very short response, resps try to distinguish the cases
relied on by the City for a conflict.

For those they cannot

distinguish, resps argue that the decisions are too old or are
wrong.

Resps cite no cases in support of their view, but instead

argue that each case should turn on its own facts and the facts
as found by the DC in this case support an Establishment Clause
violation.
~ f

Resps argue that theCA 4's reliance on Larson, even

erroneous, would not require review by this Court since the CA

affirmed the DC's findings under Lemon.
4.

DISCUSSION:

As admitted by the DC, this case squarely

conflicts with Citizens Concerned for Separation v. Denver,
supra.

The City has pointed to several other additional

conflicts.

In my opinion these conflicts, coupled with the

importance of the issue, make this case a prime candidate for
plenary review.
I recommend a grant.
There is a response.
4/6/83
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Motion of Anne Neamon
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Filing a Brief as Amicus Curiae

et al.

v.
DONNELLY,

et al.

SUMMARY:

~ ~ movant

seeks leave of the Court to file a ( ro se amicus

brief in Lynch v. Donnelly, No. 82-1256 (whether nativity scene violates
establishment clause) • Movant argues that she should be permitted to
participate as a

~

se amicus because:

rights to defend the Constitution; (2)
compelling national question; and (3)

(1) ·she has her own fundamental
This case presents an undebatable
She does not have the funds to retain

an attorney to file the brief on her behalf.
DISCUSSION:

This court has generally not entertained requests by

individuals to file
u.s. 1036 (1977).
~

pro~

as amici.

See Bates v. state Bar of Arizona, 429

Rule 36, which governs the filing of amicus briefs, makes

no explicit reference to the requirement that only members of the Bar may file

o\

--

~~- ~ WJ.Q ~ b._ ~(flood..
~
~. ntocal. ~
cb ,..,l: ~ 4..:. ~
cJoJ..d. ~ (1, ().. "\_cdlvL a\- ~ ~I
0

~ ~

f\o

~

CQIV\..~ ~ ~ ~.

-::r~

,

....'

such briefs.

But that Rule does note the applicability of . other Rules which

do make reference to the need for appearance by

counsel. ~· ~

Rule 33.2(a).

And as a matter of policy it would seem appropriate to keep the floodgates on
pro

~

amicus briefs closed.

This motion should be denied.

There is no response.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 82-1256
Lynch v. Donnelly
Joseph Neuhaus

September 30, 1983

Question Presented
Does

the

inclusion of a creche

in a Christmas celebration

provided by the City of Pawtucket, R.I., violate the Establishment Clause?

Summary
There are three
. ...., Establishment Clause tests that this Court's
cases or the parties have suggested could be used to decide this
case.

The most stringent test is the strict scrutiny standard

applied in Larson v. Valente, 456 U•• 228 (1982), which is used
for

state actions distinguishing

rather

than offering

The second test
Lemon v.

religious denominations

a benefit or detriment to all religions.

is the

Kurtzman,

among

403

tradi tiona!

u.s.

602

three-part test set out in

---__:._-----.

(1971), for gauging when state

action in general impermissibly advances or inhibits religion, or
involves the state in religion.

Finally, the Government in this

case, as well as Judge Campbell's dissent in the CA, offer what
is in effect a broad derivative of the test of historical usage
en~nciated

last

Term

in

Marsh

v.

Chambers,

103

s.

Ct.

3330

(1983).
In this memorandum,

I conclude that the Larson test is not

applicable to this case, and that the clear religious significance of a creche prevents Pawtucket's celebration from passing

&

e Lemon test.

~eligious

I believe the Government's argument that some

manifestations have been and should be a part of public

life is not unsound generally.

I do not think it would be wise

to announce or apply such a broad principle in this case, however, because the religious manifestation here advances only a sin-

-*

gle denomination rather than the transcendent principles of religion generally.

1.

t4$'2.--o

Larson v. Valente

In Larson, the Court announced the principle that when it is
presented

with

"a

state

law

granting

a

__

denominational

and
...suspect
......_

apply

strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality."

456 u.s.,

preference,"

----

at 244.

it will

"treat

the

law as

'

---

The Court made clear that such scrutiny will be trig-

gered only by "explicit and deliberate distinctions between religious organizations," and not merely by "a facially neutral statute"

that happens

to have a

religious organizations.

"'disparate

Id., at 256 n.23.

impact'" on different
JUSTICE BRENNAN, who

wrote Larson, has since phrased the test more broadly as applying
to state programs

"that discriminate[]

among

religious

and not merely in favor of all religious faiths."

faiths,

Marsh v. Cham-

bers, 103 s.ct., at 3340 n.ll (Brennan, J., dissenting).

In this

case, there is apparently no explicit discrimination against nonChristian faiths, Qg! the inclusion of the creche by no means can
be

said

to

be

facially

neutral

or

to

benefit

all

religious

L~~-LJ

faiths.
I

suspect the proper test for

the application of Larson is ~~/0

neither as strict as that opinion itself intimated nor as
as JUSTICE BRENNAN has rephrased it.
traditional equal protection analysis.

loos~

Larson appears to invoke
Under that analysis,

it

is not sufficient to show a discriminatory impact; a purpose to

--

discriminate must also be shown before a violation will be found.
See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
rality op.}

• 55, 66 (1980)

(plu-

(stating "the basic principle that only if there is

purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal

Protection

Clause

tricts);

accord

point of

the

of

the

id.,

at

Fourteenth
94-103

Larson requirement

Amendment")

(White,

J.,

(voting

dis-

dissenting).

The

that any discrimination among

religious sects be explicit is that a discriminatory intent will
not be inferred from the mere fact of a disparate impact.
I

suspect that such an

intent may be

While

inferable from something

less than explicit discrimination among sects in a given legislative act, some showing that other religious groups have been purposefully excluded from the benefits given Christians would seem
to be the minimum needed.

There is no suggestion of that in the

record here.
2.

Lemon v. Kurtzman

The Lemon test for when a state action passes muster under
the Establishment Clause is no doubt familiar:
must have a secular purpose;

(1)

the action

(2) its "principal or primary effect

------

must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3)
it
403

must

not

u.s.,
a.

foster

an

"excessive entanglement" with

religion.

at 612-613.

Purpose.

The city advanced two purposes for setting up

the creche in its Christmas display.

First, it offered a cultur-

al or traditional purpose of acknowledging the religious heritage
of the holiday, as a sort of exposition of the way in which Americans celebrate Christmas.

Second, the city said it was motivat-

ed by a commercial purpose of encouraging shopping in the city's
downtown malls.

Petn. App. A30, A53-A54

(DC opinion).

tial assertion of an aesthetic purpose was not pressed.
A53

n.28.)

The

DC

rejected

these

asserted

purposes.

(An iniId., at
Based

largely on an inference drawn from the use of a "patently reli-

A9-c:.

gious symbol" like the creche,
purpose was to advance,

bC
the ~

the court found that the city's

rather than merely to acknowledge,

Christian view of the birth of Christ.

Id., at A57.

It found

that that inference was not dissipated by the context in which
the creche was placed, noting that the city did not disavow such

-

a purpose,

that

the only religious heritage presented was

.

77
.

the

majority's, and that the mayor had vowed to fight to keep Christ 7
in Christmas.
Thus,
rived

Id., at A58-A60.

the DC's finding of a nonsecular purpose was not de-

from any direct evidence of purpose but was based on an

inference raised by the religious nature of a creche.
preach
\..........

is not

improper under

Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)

-~ Kentucky

~s~hoolrooms

this Court's cases.

This ap-

In Stone v.

(per curiam), the Court found that

statute requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in
had a "plainly religious" purpose.

That finding ap-

pears to have been based solely on the view that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular
purpose can blind us to that fact."

Ibid.

(footnote omitted) •

Nevertheless, because the religious "nature" of an object is essentially the effect it has on the average viewer, this kind of a
finding of purpose is little different from a finding of religious effect.

The fundamental defect,

overwhelmingly

religious

\\

effect,

symbol

is

if any,

therefore

in using such an
in

its 'f eligious

so I will discuss the religious or secular "nature" of

the creche in the next subsection.

..

b.

Effect.

It should be noted at the outset that while Lem-

on refers to the "principal or primary" effect, you have written
that no comparison among the various effects is required.
mittee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty
756,

783 n.39

judgments

are

(1973}

("We do not

either

possible

think

or

Com-

v.~l3 u. .

that such metaphysical

necessary."}.

Instead,

the

state action need only have "the direct and immediate effect of
~g~;L..~
advancing religion" to be impermissible.
Ibid. ,,~.....,. •• ~, ... ~.~
The DC found first that the creche is a patently religious
symbol.

The court noted that the creche does not merely depict

the historical fact of Christ's birth, but also makes a statement
about

the extraordinary nature of

the child by presenting his

birth as attended by angels, revered by shepherds, and sought out
by kings.
creche,

Petn. App. A45-A46.

unlike Santa Claus,

The court further found that the

Christmas trees,

has not lost its religious significance.
biblical accounts and
its

religious

l

stars, and bells,

It is faithful to the

needs no specialized knowledge to reveal

meaning.

For

anyone

with

the

most

rudimentary

knowledge of Western religious beliefs, the religious message of
the creche is immediately and unenigmatically conveyed.

Id., at

A46-A4 7.
Second,

the DC found

that

the context does not change the ~C:

religious effect of the display.
prominently positioned" and

"centrally and

the surrounding secular

not distract attention from it.
at 170-178 (pictures}.

The creche is

symbols do

Id., at A66-A67: see also J.A.

Moreover, "[t]he City's Christmas display

is neither a museum exhibit where one goes expecting to see cul-

tural artifacts, nor an educational course in which one expects
to be taught about heritage and tradition ••••

The display is a

celebration of the holiday, not an exposition about it."

Id., at

A67.
Third, the court found that the appearance of official sponsorship

confers

more

than

a

remote

and

incidental benefit on

Christianity, noting that the "aura of governmental approval is a
subsidy as real and as valuable as financial assistance."

Id.,

at A69.
No one has really argued that the DC was wrong on its first
Petrs admit that the creche has a uniquely religious im- ~~
~
pact in certain settings.
Brief of the Petitioners at 20 ("The

point.

solitary trace of religiosity in the entire municipal celebration
is the creche •••• Of all the Christmas symbols, the creche alone
retains

some

•••• ").

The dissent below also appears to acknowledge the con-

tinued

religious

religious

significance

force of a

creche,

in

a

religious

although

it

is less clear

about whether other Christmas symbols are different.
Al9.

setting

Petn. App.

I agree with the DC that the creche is unique among the ~

Christmas symbols

represented

in

its religious

impact.

It has

not been transmuted into a jolly and universal symbol like Santa
Claus or the tree.
the Messiah.

It plainly depicts the miraculous birth of

Unlike the other symbols, which can be and usually

are taken to represent Christmas in its broad, good-will-to-men
sense,

it is hard for a person in our culture to associate the

creche with anything other than the Christian view of the birth
of Christ.

Accord Allen v. Morton,

495 F.2d 65,

69,

73

(CADC

•.

,,

1973)

(the creche is "obviously a religious symbol"); id., at 87

(Leventhal, J., concurring)

("it is plain that a depiction of the

Nativity scene is primarily of religious significance and constitutes a 'clear religious symbol'").
Petrs' main argument,

however,

is that the religious nature

~/.r-t.

~

of the creche is dissipated by the context of its

presentat ~

They argue that the creche is a minor part of an overwhelmingly'
secular celebration.

The Government does not appear seriously to

advance this view, see Brief for the United States at 3; the dissent below seems to think that all the symbols of Christmas retain religious significance but that for historical reasons the
display of such religious symbols is not unacceptable, Petn. App.
Al9-A20.
I

find

the DC' s position more persuasive than petrs'.

The

Christmas display here is not a museum or an exposition about the
ways in which Christmas is celebrated.
tion.

It is itself a celebra-

The placement of secular symbols around the centrally po-

sitioned creche does not change the nature of the creche.

If

anything, it tends to emphasize by contrast the religious nature
of the latter.

While inclusion of the creche is not active wor-

ship like prayer in the school, it is also not a neutral presentation like a comparative religion course.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374
ble

prayer

in

u.s.

schools

203, 225 (1963)

with

permissible

Cf. Abington School
(comparing impermissicomparative

religion

courses).
(In Allen, the majority found that the context of the national Christmas Pageant of Peace dispelled the religious nature of

•'J'"

:·

the creche, but there the government posted plaques stating that
the creche was

intended to manifest the religious heritage of

Christmas, not to celebrate it, the pageant was sponsored by a
more or less independent group, and the government's support was ~~
limited to the non-creche aspects of the pageant.
73-74.

495 F.2d at

~/9b-G

In any case, the court found excessive entanglement and

granted the plaintiffs an injunction because of the government's
participation in the planning and organization committees of the
independent group.}
I also agree that the inclusion of the creche suggests the
city's approval of the religious message conveyed by it.

This

advances religion in the same way that erecting a cross on a
mountain top would, see ACLU of Georgia v. Rabun Cty. Chamber of
Commerce, 698 F. 2d 1098 (1983)

(striking down cross in state park

as religiously motivated), and in much the same way that posting
the Ten Commandments did in Stone v. Graham.

These cases estab-

lish that symbols have power and that government use of them
raises Establishment Clause concerns.

As a result, Pawtucket's

use of the creche vflunks the Lemon test because it has the direct
and immediate effect of advancing religion.

~ "7- ~

?

Holding that the creche is barred from the city's Christmas
celebration would not undermine the government's recognition or
celebration of the Christmas holiday itself, nor the many examples of religion in public life cited in the briefs (e.g. , "In
God We Trust," "God save this Honorable Court ••.• ").
There
Christmas.

are

two

bases

for

distinguishing

the

~~
creche

from

First, as the DC found, Christmas today has a funda-

mentally secular side that the government is free to recognize.
This is the side that large department stores and malls recognize
in their displays of Santa and the elves, the little drummer boy,
etc.

It is also the side recognized by The New York Times' list

of the families and individuals most deserving of charity during
the holidays.

If Pawtucket's celebration lacked only the creche,

it would be essentially the same as these and would not have the
religious

character

it

does

now.

The

fact

that

this

secular

holiday arose out of and coincides with the Christian holiday as
opposed to the last day of Hanukkah would no more condemn government's recognition of it than did the choice of Sunday as a day
of rest in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451 ( 19 61)
ing Sunday closing laws)

(uphold-

("It would seem unrealistic for enforce-

ment purposes and perhaps detrimental to the general welfare to
require a State to choose a common day of rest other than that
which most persons would select of their own accord.").
A second legitimate reason to allow government recognition of
Christmas but not the creche is that this Court has recognized
the distinction between accommodating
the population and advancing them.
at 17-18.

the

religious beliefs of

See B'nai B'rith Amicus Brief

In Zorach v. Clauson, 343

u.s.

306

(1952), the Court

upheld a system whereby students were released from public school
in order to attend religious instruction.

The Court found that

this system merely "respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates
Id.,

at 314.

the public service to their

The Court distinguished the case of McCollum v.

Board of Educ., 333

...

.-f'i

spiritual needs."

u.s.

203

(1948), in which it had held uncon-

stitutional a plan under which Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish
religion teachers hired by their respective churches would come
into the schools and teach students who asked for the instruction.

The Zorach Court said the difference was that "[i]n the

McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction
and the force of the public school was used to promote that instruction.

Here, as we have said, the public schools do no more

than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious

instruction."

343

u.s.,

at

315.

Similarly,

government

recognition of Christmas would only accommodate the public schedule to the religious needs of the people, while sponsorship of a
creche or other plainly religious symbol in the city's celebration would promote their religion.
ale
more

The problem with this ration-

is that it does not by itself justify the government doing
than merely recognizing Christmas as a holiday.

Combined

with the foregoing distinction between the secular and religious
sides of Christmas, however,

I think some government celebration

of Christmas is adequately supported.
Requiring

the city not

would not require
religion

be

Government's

struck

that

to

include a creche

in its display

the frequent governmental references to

down.

These

brief at 6-15,

references,

are nearly all

catalogued

in

the

invocations of the

concept of a Supreme Being generally, rather than references to
any particular religion or denomination.

Notably absent from the

Thanksgiving Day proclamations back to the time of Washington,
for example, are any references to Christ.

The same is true of

the motto, or the insertion of "under God" in the Pledge.

The

;>

only references to a particular religion appear to be recent ecumenical proclamations such as Jewish Heritage Week, which, given
their authors,

probably have a merely cultural purpose and ef-

fect.
The motivation for
references

is,

of

this studied avoidance of denominational

course,

political:

religious

sects express

their fervor at the voting booths while, until recently, atheists
and other nonreligious types did not, at least in great numbers.
But history and case law support the distinction.
conception of

the

Establishment Clause was

national government would

not establish a

The original

to ensure that the
national church,

derogation of the state churches already set up.
366 u.s., at 440-441.

in

See McGowan,

Justice Story suggested that the purpose

was not to bar any advancement of religion by government, but to
prevent the advancement of one sect over another.
Commentaries
{1833).

on

the

Constitution

of

the

United

3 J. Story,
States

§1871

The Thanksgiving Day proclamations further show that the

Founders, with the notable exception of Jefferson, did not think
the

Establishment

Clause

barred

the

government

from advancing

religion generally, but only from advancing any particular sect.
While this Court's cases do not go that far, see, e.g., Lemon, they do indicate that action in favor of religion generally
is of

far

less concern than action advancing the cause of any

given religion, see, e.g., Marsh, 103 s.ct., at 3335 {legislative
prayers were not seen by Founding Fathers as "placing the government's

'official seal of approval on one religious view'" but as

"'conduct whose

,.

• • • effect • • .

harmonize [d)

with the tenets of

~

some or all religions.'" (quoting McGowan}}; Larson, 456 u.s., at
244-246 & n.23

(discrimination among religions, as opposed to in

favor of religion generally, is subject to strict scrutiny}; Lemon 403 u.s., at 623
(1970}

("But in Walz

(upholding tax exemptions}]

[v.

Tax Comm'n, 397 u.s. 664

we dealt with a status under

state tax laws for the benefit of all religious groups.
are confronted with

Here we

••.

appropriations that benefit relatively

few religious groups."}.

The distinction makes a lot of sense,

~

since

the

conflict

and

oppression

that

the

Framers

sought

7?
' ..

to

avoid is, even today, far more likely to result from discrimina- _f~
A-~~

tion between sects than from discrimination against the
gious.

nonreli- ~

The latter tend to care less about these matters than do

~
~

~

believers of the "oppressed" sects.
Thus, the creche is different from the references to religion
generally about which concern has been shown, because it advances
the religious view of only one sect--Christians--rather than advancing belief in a transcendent force generally.
for

upholding the general invocations to God

(Another basis

in courtrooms and

pledges would be that these have lost any true religious significance.

..

}

.M arsh, 103 s.ct., at 3349 (Brennan, J., d1ssent1ng •

~

~~

As

noted above, this is not true of the creche.}

c.
has

The entanglement part of the Lemon test

Entanglement.

been said

to have

two parts:

administrative entanglement

resulting from the state joining with religion to run a religious
program, and political divisiveness resulting from the perception
that government is favoring some religion.
at 619-620, 622-623.

See Lemon, 403 u.s.,

Neither of the lower courts found any evi-

• >

"·

J
,..

•

dence of administrative entanglement in this case,
that it has not been present.

and I

agree

I would note only that there is

some suggestion in the record that the mayor of Pawtucket told a
press conference that he intended to place a menorah at the site
the following year "in honor or our Jewish brethren who have supported us in this."
cisely

the

religion

Pet. App. A32.

kind of hand-in-hand

that

should

be

This would appear to be pre-

entanglement of politics with

avoided.

Here,

though,

threatened and may not be official city policy.

it

is

only

The political-

divisiveness factor as it may be present in this case is essen- ~
tially an elaboration on the question of religious effect,

and

need not be dealt with separately.
3. Marsh v. Chambers and
Acknowledging Religious Heritage ( ~ ~)
Both the SG and Judge Campbell in dissent have urged a third
test that to some extent predicted the result in Marsh v. Chambers sustaining the centuries-old practice of legislative prayers.

Neither the SG nor the dissent would argue that there is

present here the "unique history"

that there was in Marsh sug-

gesting a specific intent on the part of the Framers to approve
the questioned practice.

No one has suggested that use of Nativ-

i ty scenes goes any where near

~c~~~L.-1-~

that far back • ...., But both Judge

Campbell and the SG do suggest that the use of creches, like the
practice of legislative prayers in Marsh, "has become part of the
fabric of our society," and is not an establishment of religion
but

"simply a

tolerable

acknowledgment of

among the people of this country."

Marsh,

beliefs widely held
103 S.Ct., at 3336.

For Judge Campbell, the test would appear to be whether the ques-

tioned practice has "become an ingrained part of our culture."
See Petn. App. Al9

(Campbell, J., dissenting).

To excise these

traditional symbols of Christmas would make government hostile to
religion, they say, and would sanitize the holiday of its essen~

tial meaning.
The primary problem
this ca;e.

The SG

with ~his

5

argument is its application to

a~.s-t
. _ ~h;--<<a-;-t--1~t;-;h;-e~-c=-1=· -t;-y~'-=-s-s=-=p=-o=-n=-s:-o~r~s"""fi_.,l.-:P:---:: o-;;-rr.he

creche should be permitted because of the many manifestations of
religion in public life.

As noted above, however, what is in-

grained in the national culture is not government advancement of
particular religions but government advancement of religion generally.

To extend this to allow government to promote particular

sects would be directly contrary to what the Framers had in mind
and to the lessons of several hundred years of history and case
law.

See supra pages 11-13.

Judge Campbell appears to take a different view, suggesting
------~--~--~~-----------------------------~
that what is ingrained is the government's use of the creche itself, or at least its use of the "ancient symbols" of religion.
There is, however, no evidence of this other than Pawtucket's own
forty years of experience.

My experience is to the contrary:

local governments

I

in

towns

have

lived

in scrupulously have

steered clear of appearing to promote any particular religious
view in any way.
sound

political

Christmas)
holiday.

They, like the national government, have for
reasons

declined

(given

the

to celebrate

the

proximity

of

Hanukkah

Christian nature of

to
the

It may be that Judge Campbell's view is that local

practice should be the standard of when something is ingrained in

'

.

,.,,

•.
'

•·

.

'

/

our culture.

But no case has ever suggested that government in-

volvement in religion is an area that can .be left to the good
sense of local majorities.

/~

Since religious sects tend to cluster

together in order to worship communally, allowing the historical
practices of

the

local government

to continue would

seriously ~;;
~

threaten lo~ m~or i ties.

Moreover, it would tend to encourage }

the development of isolated, government-sponsored religious
tolerance.
closed

in-

Both of these possibilities were intended to be fore-

by

states.

('

the

application of

the

Establishment Clause

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310

u.s.

to

the

296, 310 (1940).

Assuming that local practice would be insufficient, the real
measure

of

whether

something

is

ingrained

or

not under

Ju~

~~
~-

Campbell's view probably would be the judge's subjective experience.
_..

This

makes

the

ingrained-in-our-culture

test

virtually

standardless, and this is the second major problem with promulgating such a test.
self-evident

that

~
~

~

Judge Campbell appears to have thought it ~

~

creches

were

routinely

part

of

sponsored Christmas but that public masses were not.

governmentAs I have

said, my experience would suggest they both should be barred.

I

suspect that one who had grown up in Catholic New Mexico might
not find a government-sponsored Easter or Christmas service so
unusual.

Even granting that two judges can agree that a certain

governmental

religious

practice

is

not

utterly

unprecedented,

moreover, how long something must be practiced and how widely are
entirely up to the judge.
was erected

Would the twenty years that a cross

in Black Rock Mountain State Park be enough?

Radun County Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d, at 1101.

See

In sum,

I

·.

believe the purpose-effect-entanglement test of Lemon provided a
more

concrete

standard

and,

more

important,

was

more

soundly

based in experience.
A third problem with the view of the SG and the dissent is
that it inevitably furthers only the majority religion.

It fur-

ther entrenches the entrenched establishment; which is precisely
~ 1 __

what the Establishment Clause should guard against.

-~

A~

'~-~
None of these objections to an ingrained-in-our-culture test

is altered by the argument that Christ is essential to Christmas.
(I disagree with

the

this

statement as a matter of

supra page 9-10 and infra this page.)

First,

fact,

see

there is no evi-

dence that government nationally or generally publicly celebrates
the Christian nature of Christmas.

I suspect that Christmas cel-

ebration by the government is historically as nondenominational
as possible because of the political considerations noted above.
Second, as a result, whether any particular government recognition of the Christian nature of the holiday is ingrained in our
culture would depend entirely on the judge's subjective experience or on local practice.

Third, it is precisely in celebrating

the most traditional holidays of the majority that the danger of
establishment

is

greatest.

(Allowing

the

government

to

use

clearly nonreligious symbols such as Santa Claus does not raise
similar problems.

The Marsh-type test is only applicable if the

government practice would

be

an advancement of

religion under

Lemon.)
I do not see the need for sanctioning this expansion of government advancement of religion to include promotion of particu-

,, ..

.

.

.......

?

/

lar sects.

To limit government to celebrating the secular side

of Christmas does not make the holiday an empty or tasteless gesture.

The fact is that millions of people celebrate the holiday

without any reference to its religious roots.

Moreover, that is

how the other major non-church celebrator of Christmas approaches
the holiday.

Commerce avoids reference to particular religious

sects because it does not wish to offend anyone.
to be

relegated

to

the

same role

For government

is perfectly proper,

for

it

should be as zealous in seeking to avoid alienating minorities
among

its

constituents.

The

SG' s

argument that to so require

would be to show hostility to religion and establish a religion
of secularism has been rejected by this Court.

Only "affirma-

tively opposing or showing hostility to religion" will raise concern in this area.
presumption of

u.s.,

Abington, 374

the Establishment and

at 225.

Essentially, the

Free Exercise Clauses

is

that government neutrality is best ensured by government secularism.
Finally, I would emphasize that all that is involved in this
case is what the government can and cannot do by way of promoting
religion.

I argue primarily that allowing it to

religion, even

{or especially)

advance~

in a traditional setting,

given J5Ltj$"
rather

than merely advancing
contrary to

the wise

teachings of history and case law.

This

does not mean, of course, that churches, merchants associations,
and civic groups could not use the same park to erect a creche.
The distinction
sponsorship

.....

is technical but

uniquely

tends

to

important,

inhibit

the

because government
"free

competition"

~

among sects that was desired by the Framers.

This--that

govern-

ment sponsorship is different and more dangerous than mere majority

practice--is

the

clearest

command

of

the

Establishment

Clause.

.

'
.'

•

• • <

.. .
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World . Christmas has roots that are embedded deeply in the
Christian_. religion; its roots also extend to folk customs and
pagan rites that predate the birth of Christ.
The creche, however, is tied firmly to the Christian religion;
it tells the story of the birth of Christ, the Son of God. Unlike
today's Christmas holiday, the creche is not the result of the
combination of folk culture and tradition. The creche is purely
a Christian religious symbol; this is the distinction between the
creche and Christmas as a holiday. It is a distinction of constitutional significance. Although the government may .
recognize Christmas as a holiday and even participate in some
of its secular traditions, it may not participate in or promote
the Christian celebration of Christmas. To view the creche as
only one of the many symbols of the Christmas holiday season
is to denigrate its religious significance and misinterpret the
historical background of Christmas.

CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge (Dissenting). As the nativity scene
is IlrototYJ.llc~~as - and as Christmas is
itself a legal holiday whose constitutionality is not here questioned- ! think the court errs in holding that the display in a
public park ~istma~ season of characters and
animals associated with that scene constitutes "an establishment of religion" within the first amendment. Unassociated, ~,_;..J/l'
as they were, with the performance of any religious rites, the
~
fig_ures did not "establish" religion in the context in which they ,y-twere presented. They simply contributed to the message that
the holiday they represented was at hand.
It must be borne in mind that this creche was but part of a ~
l~ay in the same location which included a talking
.;wishing well, a Santa's house inhabited by a live Santa who ~
distributed candy, trees of various sizes, reindeer, and 21
.
cutout figures including a clown, dancing elephant, robot and ~~

·.
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teddy bear. The whole melange, including the creche, was
nothing more nor~ potpourri of well-recognized
Christmas symbols. Had a solitary creche been displayed in
July, one might see it as designed to serve chiefly religious
ends, since there would then be no holiday with which it was
particularly identified. But creches and Santas in December Jt1J'Aare as typically symbolic of Christmas as turkeys and Pilgrims 1
in November are symbolic of Thanksgiving.
The root of the difficulty lies in the fact that Christmas
originated as, and to some people continues to be, a religious
holiday. 1 For that reason certain of its established symbols
relate to myths bearing, for some, a religious meaning. In
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Christmas is
defined as follows:
An annual church festival kept on December 25 or by the
Armenians on January 6 in memory of the birth of Christ,
celebrated generally by a particular church service,
special gifts and greetings, and observed in most Christian communities as a legal holiday.
Because Christmas memorializes the founder of Christianity
and is a church festival, it might be argued that t e state and
national governments should not be allowed to recognize it at
all. Such an argument-unlike, I submit, the court's present
_.--:;:,~p--=o...::s_it....:.i..:..o\ -would at least be logically consistent. In my opinion, t e two most logically consistent positions are as follows:
either Christmas itself, because of its inextricably intertwined
~
religious roots, cannot constitutionally be a national holiday,
Q..UU1.v1J--t;'which case displays of the type here in issue would also be
~ unconstitutional; or else Christmas is constitutional, in which
~ ... case all its relevant symbols, including those depicting the

I

~~.-¥~

.{;..v 0./

1

I do not disagree with Judge Bownes that modern Christmas has many
.....1,1---'--A ecular and pagan aspects besides. My point is not that symbols portraying
.J,t.£J-/.A/ f' , t~ eJ:>irth of Christ are the exclusive symbols of the season; far from it. My
/)A..LJ.-j;_..-f'l'<{/oi'nt is merely that such symbols are clearly and inescapably a part of the
1
J~~-ral symbolism of the holiday, and therefore cannot be deleted without
~....1--P:... • eommitting an act of censorship against the holiday itself.
/j , ,

;_;_
-r-

H~
l

, •

~..v--

.-r

1. V47

1

i-A--
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nativity, are likewise constitutional, so long as displayed for
the pu!pose of announcing the holiday.
No one has argued in this case that Christmas as a national
holiday is itself unconstitutional. Chief Judge Pettine, it is ,1) c_
true, wrote in his opinion below that if the creche is not
declared unconstitutional, then Christmas itself might have to
be declared unconstitutional. He would thus "save" Christmas
by shearing it of all its religious trappings. This is a possible approach, but I wonder if it really works. It seems a little like
maintaining a holiday known as "Washington's Birthday"
while extirpating all reference to George Washington.
Christ~s, so long ~ailed by that name, inescapably recalls
the birth of the founder of Christianity. To "save" it by pre-~
tending to the contrary has an almost Orwellian twist. I do not
think constitutional values are furthered by this kind of thinking.
The fact is, Christmas, with its clear religious as well as its
secular roots, has become an ingrained part of our culture.
Were one today to seek to make a national holiday out of such
a church festival, constitutional objections might well prevail.
But Christmas is water over the dam. And so, I would argue,
are all its established symbols, including carols and creches. To
retain the holiday but outlaw these ancient symbols seems to
me an empty and even rather boorish gesture. 2 If creches are
to be outlawed, so too should stars and carols. And surely, the
name itself-Christmas, deriving from "Christ" and
"mass" -should be the first to go if the Constitution requires
the eradication of any and all religious connotations!
I think we should accept what seems obvious-that, for/
historic regsQ.!)s, Christmas is a constitutionally valid p;;tof 4~
our national life. In having so become, it allows like any holi- I
day the display of its accepted symbols-that and no more. To
the extent these carry religio·us as well as mythical connotations, they must when placed on public property, be shown in

tJ-/-

~

2 Although no more boorish, perhaps, than the City of Cranston's argument that the real purpose of the creche was to bring shoppers to town.

~

...... . r--- -.
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a manner limited to announcement of the holiday rather than
of a _religious celebration or the inculcation of religion. The
first 'amendment would plainly not allow the city to pay for a
Christmas mass in a public park or the like. But the nativity
scene has merged into the accepted Christmas symbolism.
When seasonally · deployed without accompanying religious
ceremonies or message, I do not think it can be said to establish
religion, any more than would the piping in of carols or similar
activities having a religious base which our society has come to
accept as part and parcel of the Christmas season.
I would uphold the constitutionality of the Rhode Island
display and reverse the decision below.

·

..

-~
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The Chief Justice

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

82-1256

DENNIS LYNCH, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DANIEL DONNELLY ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[November-,

1983]

THE CHIEF JuSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality
from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual
Christmas display.
I

Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail merchants' association, the City of Pawtucket, R. I., erects a
Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas
holiday season. In recent years, the display has been located in Hodgson Park, a private park owned by a nonprofit
organization in the heart of the City's shopping district. The
display is essentially like those to be found in hundreds of
towns or cities across the Nation-often on public groundsduring the Christmas season. The Pawtucket display is
comprised of many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas, including, among other
things, a Santa Claus' house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh,
candy-striped poles, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds
of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS
GREETINGS," and the creche at issue here. All components of this display are owned by the City.
The creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or
more years, occupies about 140 square feet of the 40,000
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square feet of the park. The figures in the creche, which
range from 5" to 5' in height, include the infant, Mary and
Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals. In 1973,
when the present creche was acquired, it cost the City $1365;
it now is valued at $200. The erection and dismantling of the
creche costs the City about $20 per year; nominal expenses
are incurred in lighting the creche. No money has been expended on maintenance of the creche for the past 10 years.
Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual members of the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Union itself, brought this action in the
United States District Court for Rhode Island, challenging
the City's inclusion of the creche in the annual display. The
District Court held that the City's inclusion of the creche
in the display violated the Establishment Clause, which is
binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D. R. I. 1981). The
District Court held that, by including the creche in the
Christmas display, the City has "tried to endorse and promulgate [religious] beliefs," 525 F. Supp., at 1173, and that
"erection of the creche has the real and substantial effect of
affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche
represents." I d., at 1177. This "appearance of official
sponsorship," it found, "confers more than a remote and incidental benefit on Christianity." I d., at 1178. Last, although the court acknowledged the absence of administrative
entanglement, it found that excessive entanglement had been
fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including
the creche in the celebration. Id., at 1179-1180. Petitioner
was permanently enjoined from including the creche in the
display.
A divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F. 2d 1029 (1982). We
granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1983). We reverse.

·f ..
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II

A
Purpose ofthe Establishment Clause
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is,
"to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either
[the church or the state] into the precincts of the other."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 614 (1970).
At the same time, however, the Court reminded that,
"total separation is not possible in an absolute sense.
Some relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable." Ibid.
An Establishment Clause challenge must be examined in
light of these principles.
The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses
as erecting a "wall" between church and state, see, e. g.,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). The
concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech
probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. 1 The
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment
Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching
it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.
No significant segment of our society and no institution
within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation
from all the other parts, much less from government. "It
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce
a regime of total separation.... " Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
760 (1973). And the Constitution does not require complete
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878)
(quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802)) .
1

•
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separation; it mandates tolerance of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U. S. 306, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333
U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require the "callous indifference" that we have said is not intended by the
Establishment Clause. Zorach, supra, at 314. Indeed, we
have observed that such hostility would bring us into "war
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion." McCollum, supra, at 211-212.
B
Contemporaneous Understanding of
the Establishment Clause
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause has
comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is
found in the events of the fust week of the First Session of
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress
approved the Establishment Clause, as part of the Bill of
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation
providing for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In
Marsh v. Chambers, - - U. S. - - (1983), we noted that
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Delegates to the Constitutional Convention where the subjects of
freedom of speech, press and religion and antagonism toward
an established church were under constant discussion. In
Marsh we held that there was no conflict with the Establishment Clause when Nebraska employed members of the
clergy as official Legislative Chaplains to give opening prayers at sessions of the State Legislature.
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Congress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the
Court's statement that the First Congress,
"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of

... ., ...

82-1256---0PINION LYNCH v. DONNELLY

5

the greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental document," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52,
174-175 (1926)
It is clear beyond doubt that neither the draftsmen of the
Constitution who were Members of the First Congress, or
the Congress of 1789, saw any Establishment problem in the
employment of Congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress, and that practice has continued to the
present day.

c

Historical Background
There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by
all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in the opinions of
this Court was this more clearly and eloquently expressed
than in the statement of Justice Douglas speaking for the
Court in the opinion validating a program allowing release of
public school students from classes to attend off-campus religious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated
the Establishment Clause, the Court stated:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,
315 (1952).
Our history is replete with official references to the value
and need for Divine guidance and they are found repeatedly
in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers as well as contemporary leaders. Beginning in the
early colonial period long before Independence, a day of
Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to give
thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God. President Washington and his successors have proclaimed Thanksgiving Day, with all its religious overtones 2 and Congress
' The day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged
President Washington to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many

-
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made it a National Holiday. 5 U. S. C. § 6103(a) (1982).
With the passage of time, that Holiday like Christmas has
taken on more and more a secular cast, but it has not lost its
theme of expressing thanks for Divine aid. 3
Executive orders and other official announcements of Presidents and of the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas
and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms.
And, by acts of Congress, it has long been the practice that
federal employees are released from duties on these National
Holidays, while being paid from the same public revenues
that provide the compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate
and the House and the military. Thus, it is clear that government has long recognized-indeed it has subsidized-holidays with religious significance not fundamentally different
from the creche challenged here.
Other examples of religious references are found in the
statutorily prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," 36
and signal favours of Almighty God." See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church
and State in the United States 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964). President Washington proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to "offer[] our
prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and
beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions .. .. " 1
J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897 64 (1899).
Presidents Adams and Madison also issued thanksgiving proclamations,
as have almost all our presidents, see 3 A. Stokes, Church and State in the
United States 180-193 (1950), through the incumbent, see Proclamation
No. 4883, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,153 (1981).
' An example is found in President Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of
Thanksgiving:
"[l]t is fitting that we give thanks with special fervor to our Heavenly
Father for the mercies we have received individually and as a nation and
for the blessings He has restored, through the victories of our arms and
those of our Allies, to His children in other lands.

***

To the end that we may bear more earnest witness to our gratitude to
Almighty God, I suggest a nationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures during the period from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas." Proclamation No.
2629, 9 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1944).

82-1256--0PINION
LYNCH v. DONNELLY

7

U. S. C. § 186 (1976), which Congress and the President
mandated for our currency, see 31 U.S. C. §324 (1976); and
in the language "One nation under God," as part of the Pledge
of Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by
countless thousands of public school children-and adultsevery year. Other official acknowledgments of our religious
history are readily found. 4
Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the 15th and 16th Centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith; the National Gallery in
Washington, for example, has long exhibited masterpieces
with religious messages, notably Dali's Last Supper, and numerous paintings depicting the birth of Christ, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, among many other paintings
with Christian themes and messages. 5 The very chamber in
which oral arguments on this case were heard is decorated
with a notable and permanent-not seasonal-symbol of religion: Moses with Ten Commandments. Congress has long
provided chapels in the Capitol for religious worship and
meditation.
These are but a few illustrations of government acknowledgment of our religious heritage. One cannot look at even a
'On the urging of Congress, Pub. L. No. 97-280, 96 Stat. 1211, President Reagan proclaimed 1983 the " 'Year of the Bible' in recognition of both
the formative influence the Bible has been for our Nation, and our national
need to study and apply the teachings of the Holy Scriptures." Proclamation No. 5018, 48 Fed. Reg. 5527 (1983).
Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of
Prayer each year "on which the people of the United States may turn to
God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals."
36 U. S. C. § 169h (1976). Our presidents have repeatedly issued such
proclamations. See, e. g. , Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261
(1983); Proclamation No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation
No. 4379, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087, 36 Fed. Reg.
19,961 (1971); Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proclamation No. 3501, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962).
• The National Gallery currently exhibits more than 200 similar religious
paintings .

..
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brief resume of those relationships without finding that our
history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs such as
Justice Douglas expressed in Z orach, supra. Equally pervasive is the concept of tolerance of all faiths, and all forms of
religious expression. 6
This history may help explain why the Court consistently
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause. We have refused "to construe the Religion
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objectives as illuminated by history." Walz
v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in
applying the Establishment Clause to religious expression is
simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court.
D

Judicial Scrutiny Under The Clause
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental
conduct or statutes that confer benefits on religion-as an absolutist approach would dictate-the Court has scrutinized
challenged legislation or official conduct to determine
whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so. See Walz, supra, at 669. This approach
is consistent with what Joseph Story wrote a century and a
half ago:
"The real object of the First Amendment was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of
the national government." 3 Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 1871 (1833).
6
Presidential proclamations and messages have issued to commemorate
Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No. 4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077
(1981), and the Jewish High Holy Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058
(Sept. 29, 1981).
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In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing and no fixed,
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed section of a
legal code capable of mechanical application. The purpose of
the Clause "was to state an objective, not to write a statute."
Walz, supra, at 668. The Clause does not provide a definition of an established church or religion but the draftsmen
and their contemporaries knew well what it was.
The line between permissible relationships and those
barred by the Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due process can be defined in a single stroke or
phrase or test. The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, [a]
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon, supra, at 614.
In the line-drawing process we have at times found it useful to inquire (a) whether the challenged law or conduct has a
secular purpose; (b) whether its principal or primary effect
advances or inhibits religion; and (c) whether it creates an
excessive entanglement of government with religion. For
present purposes, the focus of the inquiry must be on the
creche in the context of the entire Christmas display, not on
the creche in isolation. See e. g. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S.
39 (1980) (per curiam); Abingdon School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on
public classroom walls. But the Court carefully pointed out
that the Commandments were posted as a religious admonition, rather than being "integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative
religion, or the like." 449 U. S., at 42. Similarly, in
Abingdon, although the Court struck down the practices in
two states requiring daily Bible readings in public schools, it
specifically noted that nothing in the Court's holding was intended to "indicat[e] that such study of the Bible or of reli-

-
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gion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the
First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225.
(a) Here the District Court found that the inclusion of the
creche had no secular purpose, and in so doing it rejected the
City's claim that its reasons for including the creche were essentially the same as its reason for sponsoring the display as
a whole. The creche, which is a very small part of the total,
simply depicts the historical origins and traditional elements
of Christmas as part of the occasion that has long been recognized as a legal Holiday. The City's purposes are broad and
general. In part it seeks to attract people to the downtown
commercial area in a continuing effort to promote retail sales
for the merchants. At the same time it goes beyond the
commercial aspect and seeks to engender a friendly community spirit for the celebration of the Holiday, perhaps diverting focus from less pleasant events.
In celebrating holidays or other popular events, a community objective may be stimulation of patriotism, or community pride and loyalty. It may seek to honor a football team,
a golf champion, a political or public leader, or a returning astronaut. Whatever the occasion, the sentiments are not necessarily shared by 100 percent of the community. Those
who do not agree, those who are indifferent, even those who
are opposed, are free to ignore the occasion. Nothing is
forced on them in these situations and nothing is forced on
the observers of the display in Pawtucket.
The Court has invoked the Establishment Clause to invalidate legislation or governmental action on the ground that
secular purpose was lacking, but it has done this only when
there was no question that the statute or activity was predominantly motivated by religious considerations. See,
e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U. S. 97 (1968); Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra;
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Even where the benefit to religion is substantial, as with the exemption of

.{.
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churches from taxation, we saw no conflict with the Establishment Clause; history was an important factor in the
Court's holding in Walz, supra.
There is no evidence in this case to suggest that the inclusion of the creche was a purposeful or surreptitious effort to
express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy or endorsement of religion or a particular religious message. The
City, like the Congress and Presidents, has simply taken
note of a significant historical event long celebrated in the
Western world. The creche is "simply one of a group of objects assembled to show how the American people celebrate
the holiday season surrounding Christmas." See Allen v.
HjPkel, 424 F. 2d 944, 949 (CADC 1970).
Chief Judge Campbell's cogent observations in dissent in
the Court of Appeals reflect the secular purpose of the display in promoting a spirit of tolerance and accommodation:
"The whole melange, including the creche, was nothing
more nor less than a potpourri of well-recognized Christmas symbols. Had a solitary creche been displayed in
July, one might see it as designed to serve chiefly religious ends, since there would then be no holiday with
which it was particularly identified. But creches and
Santas in December are as typically symbolic of Christmas as turkeys and Pilgrims in November are symbolic
of Thanksgiving." 525 F. Supp., at 1037-1038.
The real question is whether, taken as a whole, including the
creche, the display is so devoid of secular purpose that it violates the Establishment Clause and must be suppressed. On
this record we hold that the purpose of the challenged display
as a whole is secular.
(b) The District Court found that the primary effect of inclusion of the creche is to advance religion. Comparisons of
the relative benefits to religion of different forms of support
are elusive and difficult to make. But to conclude that the
primary effect of the creche in this display represents a significant and thus impermissible benefit would require that we

v
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view it as more beneficial to religion, for example, than the
expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the country to church-sponsored schools,
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); 7 the expenditure of public funds for transportation of students attending church-sponsored schools, Everson v. Board of Education, supra; 8 the Federal grants for college buildings of
church-sponsored institutions of higher education which are a
part of an institutional complex combining secular and religious education, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971);
the noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and
universities, Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U. S.
736 (1976); the tax exemption for church properties sanctioned in Walz, supra; or the Sunday closing laws upheld in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). 9 We are
unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving from the
creche than from these benefits previously approved. What
was said about the legislative prayers in Marsh, supra, at
- - , and implied about the Sunday Closing Laws in
McGowan is true of the City's inclusion of the creche: its
"reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some . . . religions." See McGowan,
supra, at 442.
The Court has made it abundantly clear that "not every
law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit
upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally
invalid." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra. Here, given the context in which the creche is dis7
The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school." 392 U. S., at 244.
8
In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "some children might not be
sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares . . ." 330 U. S., at 17.
9
"ln McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions an~ even attend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776.

' .•
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played, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote and incidental; the primary effect of
the creche no more advances religion than the Congressional
and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself
as "Christ's Mass."
(c) The District Court found that there had been no administrative entanglement between religion and state resulting
from the City's ownership and use of the creche. 525 F.
Supp., at 1179. But it went on to hold that some political
divisiveness was engendered by this litigation. Coupled
with an impermissible sectarian purpose and effect, this persuaded the court that there was "excessive entanglement."
The Court of Appeals expressly declined to accept the District Court's finding that inclusion of the creche has caused
political divisiveness, and noted that this Court has never
held that the potential for political divisiveness alone was sufficient to invalidate government conduct.
Entanglement is a question of kind and degree. Here
there was no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the content of the exhibit prior to or since the City's
purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of
the creche have been necessary; and since the City owns the
creche, now valued at $200.00, the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. Nor does the display implicate any
ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state.
There is here nothing like the continuing involvement
present in Nyquist, supra; Lemon, supra; and Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472 (1973).
Apart from this litigation there is no evidence of political
friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history
of the Christmas celebration apart from this litigation. Paradoxically, given its intimation of divisiveness, the District
Court stated that the inclusion of the creche for 40 yearsnad
be~ed by no apparent dissension" and that the display has had a "calm history." 525 F. Supp., at 1179. Respondents cannot by the very act of commencing this lawsuit

I
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create a situation of divisiveness and then proceed to exploit
it as evidence.
We are satisfied that the City's primary purpose in including the creche is secular, not sectarian, that it does not impermissibly advance religion, and that it does not create excessive entanglement between religion and government.
E

A creche, like a painting, is passive; in this context it is a
reminder of the origins of Christmas. Of course it is identified with a religious faith but no more so than the examples
we have set out from prior cases in which we found no conflict
with the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., McGowan,
supra; Marsh, supra. The creche may well have special
meaning to those whose faith includes the celebration of religious masses, but none who sense the origins of the Christmas celebration would fail to be aware of its religious implications. Even the traditional, purely secular displays extant
at Christmas, with or without a creche, would inevitably recall those religious implications.
To compel the removal of this one passive symbol-the
creche-from a display at the very time people are taking
note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in public
schools and other public places would be a stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and our holdings. If the presence of the creche in this display violates the Establishment
Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas are equally offensive to the Constitution; and it would
mean that we wrongly decided a long line of cases.
In Everson, supra, the Court recognized that the "fears
and political problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses
in the 18th century are of less concern in the present day.
330 U. S., at 8. It would be ironic if the inclusion of a single
symbol of a particular historic religious event, as part of a
celebration acknowledged in the Western world for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, by the Executive
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Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two centuries,
would so "taint" the whole exhibit as to make it violative of
the Establishment Clause.
We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury,
the Vicar of Rome or other powerful religious leaders behind
every acknowledgment of the religious symbols which have
long been officially recognized by the three constitutional
branches of government. In short, any notion that these
symbols of Christmas pose a real danger of establishment of a
state church is farfetched indeed.
F

That this Court has been alert to the constitutionally expressed opposition to the establishment of religion is shown
in numerous holdings. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra;
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Epperson v.
Arkansas, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra; and McCollum v.
Board of Education, supra. The most recent example is
found in the case invalidating a municipal ordinance granting
to a church a virtual veto power over the licensing of liquor
establishments near a church. Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
- - U. S. - - (1983). Taken together these cases abundantly demonstrate the Court's concern to protect the genuine objectives of the Establishment Clause. It is far too late
in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the Establishment
Clause on the country.
III
We hold that the challenged program of the City of Pawtucket does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment ofthe Court of Appeals is reversed.
Reversed.

Of&nni o-f tlt~1tniub .i\tatt•
-.uJrin:!lhm. ~. Of. 211bi"-&'

ibpr~mt

CHAMI!IERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 16, 1983

Re:

82-1256 - Lynch v. Donnally

Dear Chief:
Although I will await Bill Brennan's dissent, I
may want to add a few words of my own because I am
quite troubled about the almost total disregard of the
District Court's findings of fact which were sustained
by the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

·~.

Sincerely,

,)

CoPies to

'

.

"

'

,juprtuu Ofltltri &rf tqt ~tb ,Jta.tts

-Mfring~ ~. <!J. 21lc?'!'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 18, 1983
Re:

No. 82-1256

Lynch v. Donnelly

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

.'

$5uptttnt <lfou.rt of tlrt ~b .;§tattg

1iatlfrhtg-Utn. IS. QJ.

2o.;t'!~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 18, 1983

Re:

No. 82-1256-Lynch v. Donnelly

Dear Chief:
I await the dissent or dissents.
Sincerely,

/.PI·
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

.ilu;rrtmt Qflturlltf tfrt ~tb .italt$
Jlrur~ ~.

Of.

20~"~

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

November 21, 1983

Re:

82-1256 - Lynch v. Donnelly

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
cpm

November 23, 1983

82-1256 r.vnch v. Donnelly
DPar C'hief:
Your third draft adds a sentence on paqe 14 that
in view of Lemon v. Kurtzman vou may wish to clarify:
"Be that as it may, this case does not involve a subsidv to church-soonsored schools
or colleqes: the lnqui~v into potential divi!=;tveness is not ca1.1er1 f.or, Mueller v. Allen,
TJ.S.
, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n. ll."

--

No douht you added this to reiect the argument
that the citv's soonsorship of the crechP mav create political ~ivisiveness. As this case does not involve churchsponsored schools or colleges, it i~ unnecessary to refer to
them in this context. I think the sentence well could be
read as saying that "nolitical divisiveness" is a concern
only in cases involvi~q subsidies to schools and colleges as
contrasted wtth other reliqious institutions.
Your landmark decision in LPmon v. Kurtzman does
not limit the political-divisiveness inqutrv as your new
sentence mfqht h~ read to suggest. Nor does Mueller v. Al1en limit th~ inquiry.
The purpose of the chanqe, a~ I underst~nd it,
could he att!=line-d si.mply by replacing the 1anquaqe "does not
involve a subsidy to church-sponsored schools or co1leqes"
on p. 14 w'i.th the fo11owi.nq:
"DoPs not involve a ~irect financial subsidy
to religious in~titutions or church-sponsore~
groups" -or some similar words.
Sincerely,
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

PERSONAL

Re:

82-1256

/

Lynch v. Donnelly

Dear Lewis:
I reached for the telephone to respond to your
November 23 memo and then recalled you are en route to
Richmond.
The sentence you refer to was a response to a
request from Bill Rehnquist and the only difference I can
see between what I have said and what you suggest is the
word "direct" which I omitted deliberately.
My reasoning is that textbook and bus transportation is as much a "subsidy" as anything could be and
almost as direct as cash to a college for a building. My
footnote was an effort to deal with this: older cases
virtually concede books and buses have saved parochial
schools.
However, I see no problem in adding "or religious
institutions" after "colleges" and inserting "direct"
adjectively ahead of "subsidy." In another case I would
consider myself free to say that there really is no
difference except degree in the "aid" to a religion
whether we provide books or buildings to a school or pews
in a church. Since we do not need to decide it in this
case, I can comply as above.
The past cases contain a good bit of stilted
nonsense on what will "establish" a religion. I want to
move away from that paranoid approach.

Justice Powell

'

.

ff

(
'J

q I01
I

(~

J usuce
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
}:Z. 13 1'j . Justice
I I
Justice

Y..

From:

vv mte
Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

The Chief Justice

Circulated:----------

DEC

11983

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1256

DENNIS LYNCH, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DANIEL DONNELLY ET AL.
I

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[December - ,

/~e

THE CHIEF JuSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality
from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual
Christmas display.
I
Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail merchants' association, the City of Pawtucket, R. I., erects a
Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas
holiday season. The display is situated in a park owned by a
nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the shopping district. The display is essentially like those to be
found in hundreds of towns or cities across the Nation-often
on public grounds-during the Christmas season. The Pawtucket display is comprised of many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas, including,
among other things, a Santa Claus' house, reindeer pulling
Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear,
hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," and the creche at issue here. All
components of this display are owned by the City.
The creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or
more years, occupies about 140 iquare feet of the 40,000
square feet of the whole area. ; rhe figures in the creche,
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which range from 5" to 5' in height, include the Infant Jesus,
Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals. In
1973, when the present creche was acquired, it cost the City
$1365; 'it now is valued at $200. The erection and dismantling of the creche costs the City about $20 per year; nominal
expenses are incurred in lighting the creche. No money has
been expended on maintenance of the creche for the past 10
years.
Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual members of the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Union itself, brought this action in the
United States District Court for Rhode Island, challenging
the City's inclusion of the creche in the annual display. The
District Court held that the City's inclusion of the creche
in the display violated the Establishment Clause, which is
binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D. R. I. 1981). The
District Court held that, by including the creche in the
Christmas display, the City has ''tried to endorse and promulgate [religious] beliefs," 525 F. Supp., at 1173, and that
"erection of the creche has the real and substantial effect of
affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche
represents." I d., at 1177. This "appearance of official
sponsorship," it held, "confers more than a remote and incidental benefit on Christianity." Id., at 1178. Last, although the court acknowledged the absence of administrative
entanglement, it found that excessive entanglement had been
fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including
the creche in the celebration. Id., at 1179-1180. Petitioner
was permanently enjoined from including the creche in the
display.
A divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F. 2d 1029 (1982). We
granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1983). We reverse.
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II
A
Purpose of the Establishment Clause
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is,
''to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either
[the church or the state] into the precincts of the other."
Lerrwn v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1970).

At the same time, however, the Court reminded that,
''total separation is not possible in an absolute sense.
Some relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable." Ibid.
An Establishment Clause challenge must be examined in
light of these principles.
The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses
as erecting a ''wall" between church and state, see, e. g.,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). The
concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech
probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. 1 The
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment
Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching
it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.
No significant segment of our society and no institution
within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation
from all the other parts, much less from government. "It
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce
a regime of total separation.... " Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
760 (1973). And the Constitution does not require complete
'See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878)
(quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802)).

\
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separation; it mandates tolerance of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any. See, .e. g.J Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U. S. 306, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333
U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require the "callous indifference" that we have said is not intended by the
Establishment Clause. Zorach, supra, at 314. Indeed, we
have observed that such hostility would bring us into "war
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion." McCollum, supra, at 211-212.
B
Contemporaneous Understanding of
the Establishment Clause
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause has
comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is
found in the events of the first week of the First Session of
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress
approved the Establishment Clause, as part of the Bill of
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation
providing for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In
Marsh v. Chambers, - - U. S. - - (1983), we noted that
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Delegates to the Constitutional Convention where the subjects of
freedom of speech, press and religion and antagonism toward
an established church were under constant discussion. In
Marsh we held that there was no conflict with the Establishment Clause when Nebraska employed members of the
clergy as official Legislative Chaplains to give opening prayers at sessions of the State Legislature.
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Congress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the
Court's statement that the First Congress,
"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of
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the greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental document," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52,
174-175 (1926)
.
.

It is clear beyond doubt that neither the draftsmen of the
Constitution who were Members of the First Congress, or
the Congress of 1789, saw any Establishment problem in the
employment of Congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress, and that practice has continued to the
present day. It would be difficult to identify a more striking
example of the accommodation of religious belief intended by
the Framers.

c

Historical Background

There is an unbroken history of official aclmowledgment by
all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in the opinions of
this Court was this more affirmatively expressed than in the
statement of Justice Douglas speaking for the Court in the
opinion validating a program allowing release of public school
students from classes to attend off-campus religious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated the
Establishment Clause, the Court stated:
''We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,
315 (1952).
Our history is replete with official references to the value
and need for Divine guidance and they are found repeatedly
in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers as well as contemporary leaders. Beginning in the
early colonial period long before Independence, a day of
Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to give
thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God. President Washington and his successors have proclaimed Thanks-

.,>,
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giving Day, with all its religious overtones 2 and Congress
made it a National Holiday. 5 U. S. C. § 6103(a) (1982).
With the passage of time, that Holiday like Christmas has
taken on more and more a secular cast, but it has not lost its
theme of expressing thanks for Divine aid. 8
Executive orders and other official announcements of Presidents and of the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas
and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms.
And, by acts of Congress, it has long been the practice that
1
The day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged
President Washington to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many
and signal favours of Almighty God." See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church
and State in the United States 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964). President Washington proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to "offer{] our
prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and
beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions. . . . " 1
J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897 64 (1899).
Presidents Adams and Madison also issued thanksgiving proclamations,
as have almost all our presidents, see 3 A. Stokes, Church and State in the
United States 180-193 (1950), through the incumbent, see Proclamation
No. 4883, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,153 (1981).
1
An example is found in President Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of
Thanksgiving:
"[l)t is fitting that we give thanks with special fervor to our Heavenly
Father for the mercies we have received individually and as a nation and
for the blessings He has restored, through the victories of our arms and
those of our Allies, to His children in other lands.

•••

To the end that we may bear more earnest witness to our gratitude to
Almighty God, I suggest anationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures during the period from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas." Proclamation No.
2629, 9 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1944).
President Reagan and his immediate predecessors have issued similar
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5098, 48 Fed. Reg. 42,801
(1983); Proclamation No. 4803, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,633 (1980); Proclamation
No. 4333,39 Fed. Reg. 40,003 (1974); Proclamation No. 4093,36 Fed. Reg.
21,401 (1971); Proclamation No. 3752, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,635 (1966); Proclamation No. 3560, 28 Fed. Reg. 11,871 (1963).

··"~~
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federal employees are released from duties on these National
Holidays, while being paid from the same public revenues
that provide the compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate
and the House and the military. Thus, it is clear that government has long recognized-indeed it has subsidized-holidays with religious significance not fundamentally different
from the creche challenged here.
Other examples of religious references are found in the
statutorily prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," 36
U. S. C. § 186 (1976), which Congress and the President
mandated for our currency, see 31 U. S. C. § 324 (1976); and
in the language "One nation under God," as part of the Pledge
of Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by
countless thousands of public school children-and adultsevery year. Other official acknowledgments of our religious
history are readily found. 4
Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the 15th and 16th Centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith; the National Gallery in
Washington, for example, has long exhibited masterpieces
with religious messages, notably the Last Supper, and paintings depicting the Birth of Christ, the Crucifixion, and the
Resurrection, among many others with Christian themes and
• Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of
Prayer each year "on which the people of the United States may turn to
God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals."
36 U. S. C. § 169h (1976). Our presidents have repeatedly issued such
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261
(1983); Proclamation No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation
No. 4379,40 Fed. Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087,36 Fed. Reg.
19,961 (1971); Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proclamation No. 3501, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962).
Presidential proclamations and messages have issued to commemorate
Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No. 4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077
(1981), and the Jewish High Holy Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058
(Sept. 29, 1981).
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messages. 5 The very chamber in which oral arguments on
this case were heard is decorated with a notable and permanent-not seasonal-symbol of religion: Moses with Ten
Commandments. Congress has long provided chapels in the
Capitol for religious worship and meditation.
These are but a few illustrations of government acknowledgment of our religious heritage. One cannot look at even a
brief resume of those relationships without finding that our
history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs such as
Justice Douglas expressed in Z O'T'aCh, supra. Equally pervasive is the concept of tolerance of all faiths, and all forms of
religious expression.
D

Judicial Scrutiny Under The Clause
This history may help explain why the Court consistently
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause. We have refused ''to construe the Religion
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objectives as illuminated by history." Walz
v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in
applying the Establishment Clause to religious expression is
simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court.
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental
conduct or statutes that confer benefits on religion-as an absolutist approach would dictate-the Court has scrutinized
challenged legislation or official conduct to determine
whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so. See Walz, supra, at 669. This approach
is consistent with what Joseph Story wrote a century and a
half ago:
5
The National Gallery currently exhibits more than 200 similar religious
paintings.
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"The real object of the First Amendment was . . . to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of
the national government/' 3 Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 1871 (1833).
In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed,
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed paragraph
in a legal code capable of mechanical application. The purpose of the Establishment Clause ''was to state an objective,
not to write a statute." Walz, supra, at 668. The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the
Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due
process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test.
The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, [a] variable barrier
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.,. Lemon, supra, at 614.
In the line-drawing process we have at times found it useful to inquire (a) whether the challenged law or conduct has a
secular purpose; (b) whether its principal or primary effect
advances or inhibits religion; and (c) whether it creates an
excessive entanglement of government with religion. For
present purposes, the focus of the inquiry must be on the
creche in the context of the entire Christmas display, not
on the creche in isolation. See e. g. Stone v. Graham, 449
U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Abingdon School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on
public classroom walls. But the Court carefully pointed out
that the Commandments were posted as a religious admonition, rather than being "integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative
religion, or the like." 449 U. S., at 42. Similarly, in
Abingdon, although the Court struck down the practices in

¥.
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two states requiring daily Bible readings in public schools, it
specifically noted that nothing in the Court's holding was intended to ''indicat[e] that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objecti.vely. as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the
First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225.
(a) Here the District Court found that the inclusion of the
creche had no secular purpose, and in so doing it rejected the
City's claim that its reasons for including the creche were essentially the same as its reason for sponsoring the display as
a whole. The City's purposes are broad and general. The
creche, which is a very small part of the total, simply depicts
the historical origins and traditional elements of Christmas as
part of the occasion that has long been recognized as a legal
Holiday. In part it seeks to attract people to the downtown
commercial area in a continuing effort to promote retail sales
for the merchants. At the same time it goes beyond the
commercial aspect and seeks to engender a friendly community spirit for the celebration of the Holiday, perhaps diverting focus from less pleasant events.
*OMI-35/0N
The Court has invoked the Establishment Clause to invalih)~
date legislation or governmental action on the ground that
secular purpose was lacking, but it has done this only when
~
1'~~ (..(Mit 1). Yl Jet\-\
there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated by religious considerations. See, e. g., Stone v. Gra·l'o ~~i
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The City, like the Congress and Presidents, has simply taken
note of a significant historical event long celebrated in the
Western world. The creche is "simply one of a group of objects assembled to show how the American people celebrate
the holiday season surrounding Christmas." See Allen v.
Hickel, 424 F. 2d 944, 949 (CADC 1970).
Chief Judge Campbell's cogent observations in dissent in
the Court of Appeals reflect the secular purpose of the display in promoting a spirit of tolerance and accommodation:
"The whole melange, including the creche, was nothing
more nor less than a potpourri of well-recognized Christmas symbols. Had a solitary creche been displayed in
July, one might see it as designed to serve chiefly religious ends, since there would then be no holiday with
which it was particularly identified. But creches and
Santas in December are as typically symbolic of Christmas as turkeys and Pilgrims in November are symbolic
of Thanksgiving." 525 F. Supp., at 1037-1038.
The real question is whether, taken as a whole, including the
creche, the display ~vidences a religious purpose violative of
the Establishment Clause and must be suppressed. On this
record we hold that the purpose of the challenged display as a
whole is secular.
(b) The District Court found that the primary effect of inclusion of the creche is to advance religion. Comparisons of
the relative benefits to religion of different forms of support
are elusive and difficult to make. But to conclude that the
primary effect of the creche i im ermis ible would require
that we view it as more benefic1
an more an en ors ment of religion, for example, than the expenditure of large
sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the
country to students at church-sponsored schools, Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); 6 the expenditure
'The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school." 392 U. S., at 244.
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of public funds for transportation of students attending
church-sponsored schools, Everscm v. Board of Education,
supra; 7 the Federal grants for college buildings of churchsponsored institutions of higher education which are a part of
an institutional complex combining secular and religious education, Tilton v. Rickardscm, 403 U. S. 672 (1971); the noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities, Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976);
the tax exemption for church properties sanctioned in Walz,
supra. It would also require that we view it as more of an
endorsement of religion than the Sunday closing laws upheld
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 8 the release
time program for religious training in Z orach, supra; and the
legislative prayers upheld in Marsh, supra.
We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving
from inclusion of the creche than from these benefits previously approved. What was said about the legislative prayers in Marsh, supra, at - - , and implied about the Sunday
Closing Laws in McGowan is 't rue of the City's inclusion of
the creche: its ''reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some . . . religions." See
McGowan, supra, at 442.
The Court has made it abundantly clear that ''not every
law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit
upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally
invalid." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra. Here, given the context in which the creche is displayed, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote and incidental; the primary effect of
In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "some children might not be
sent to the church schoois if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares ... " 330 U. S., at 17.
8
"ln McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even attend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776.
7
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the creche no more advances
endorse religion than the
Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the
Holiday itself as "Christ's Mass."
(c) The District Court found that there had been no administrative entanglement between religion and state resulting
from the City's ownership and use of the creche. 525 F.
Supp., at 1179. But it went on to hold that some political
divisiveness was engendered by this litigation. Coupled
with an impermissible sectarian purpose and effect, this persuaded the court that there was "excessive entanglement."
The Court of Appeals expressly declined to accept the District Court's finding that inclusion of the creche has caused
political divisiveness, and noted that this Court has never
held that the potential for political divisiveness alone was sufficient to invalidate government conduct.
Entanglement is a question of kind and degree. Here
there was no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the content of the exhibit prior to or since the City's
purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of
the creche have been necessary; and since the City owns the
creche, now valued at $200.00, the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. Nor does the display implicate any
ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state.
There is here nothing like the continuing administrative involvement present in Nyquist, supra; Lemon, supra; and
Levitt v. Committee j& Public Education, 413 U. S. 472
(1973).
Apart from this litigation there is no evidence of political
friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history
of the Christmas celebration. Paradoxically, given its intimation of divisiveness, the District Court stated that the inclusion of the creche for 40 years had been "marked by no apparent dissension" and that the display has had a "calm
history." 525 F. Supp., at 1179. Of course, respondents
cannot, by the very act of commencing this lawsuit, create
the appearance of divisiveness and then proceed to exploit it
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as evidence. Be that as it may, this case does not involve a
jirect. subsidy to church-sponsored schools or colleges, Q!:
other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into potential divisiveness is called- for, Mueller v. Allen, - .- U. S.
- , 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n. 11 (1983).
We are satisfied that the City's primary purpose in including the creche is secular, not sectarian, that it does not impermissibly advance religion, and that it does not create excessive entanglement between religion and government.
E

A creche, like a painting, is passive; in this context it is a
reminder of the origins of Christmas. Of course it is identified with a religious faith but no more so than the examples
we have set out from prior cases in which we found no conflict
with the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., McGowan,
supra; Marsh, supra. The creche may well have special
meaning to those whose faith includes the celebration of religious masses, but none who sense the origins of the Christmas celebration would fail to be aware of its religious implications. Even the traditional, purely secular displays extant
at Christmas, with or without a creche, would inevitably recall those religious implications.
To compel the removal of this one passive symbol-the
creche-from a display at the very time people are taking
note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in public
schools and other public places would be a stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and our holdings. If the presence of the creche in this display violates the Establishment
Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas are equally offensive to the Constitution.
In Everson, supra, the Court recognized that the "fears
and political problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses
in the 18th century are of less concern in the present day.
330 U. S., at 8. It would be ironic if the inclusion of a single
symbol of a particular historic religious event, as part of a
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celebration acknowledged in the Western world for 20 centuries, and in this country by ·the ·people, by the Executive
Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two centuries,
would so ''taint" the whole exhibit as to make it violative of
the Establishment Clause.
We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury,
the Vicar of Rome or other powerful religious leaders behind
every acknowledgment of the religious symbols which have
long been officially recognized by the three constitutional
branches of government. In short, any notion that these
symbols of Christmas pose a real danger of establishment of a
state church is farfetched indeed.
F
That this Court has been alert to the constitutionally expressed opposition to the establishment of religion is shown
in numerous holdings striking down statutes or programs as
violative of the Clause. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra;
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Epperson v.
Arkansas, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra; and McCollum v.
Board of Education, supra. The most recent example is
found in the case invalidating a municipal ordinance granting
to a church a virtual veto power over the licensing of liquor
establishments near a church. Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
- - U. S. - - (1983). Taken together these cases abundantly demonstrate the Court's concern to protect the genuine objectives of the Establishment Clause. It is far too late
in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the Clause on the
country.

III

We hold that the challenged program of the City of Pawtucket does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 9 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
Reversed.
'The Court of Appeals viewed Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982),
as commanding a "strict scrutiny" due to the City's ownership of the $200
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creche which it considers as a discrimination between Christian and other
religions. It is correct that we require strict scrutiny of a statute or practice discriminatory on its face. But we are unable to see this display, or
any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in
Larson any more than the hundreds, if not thousands, of religious paintings exhibited in galleries and museums throughout the country are discriminatory against non-Christian religions.
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opposite message. See generally Abington School District
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1970), as a
guide to detecting these two forms of unconstitutional government action. 1 It is has never been entirely clear, however, how the three parts of the test relate to the principles
enshrined in the Establishment Clause. Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device.
II

In this case, as even the District Court found, there is no
institutional entanglement. Nevertheless, the appellees
contend that the political divisiveness caused by Pawtucket's
display of its creche violates the excessive-entanglement
prong of the Lemon test. The Court's opinion follows the
suggestion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. - - , - - n. 11
'The Court wrote in Lemon v. Kurtzman that a statute must pass three
tests to withstand Establishment Clause challenge.
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 403 U. S., at 61~13 (citations omitted).
Though phrased as a uniformly applicable test for constitutionality, this
three-part test "provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with
Establishment Clause challenges." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. - - , - (1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)).
Moreover, the Court has held that a statute or practice that plainly embodies an intentional discrimination among religions must be closely fitted
to a compelling state purpose in order to survive constitutional challenge.
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982). As the Court's opinion observes, ante, at-- n. 9, this case does not involve such discrimination.
The Larson standard, I believe, may be assimilated to the Lemon test in
the clarified version I propose. Plain intentional discrimination should
give rise to a presumption, which may be overcome by a showing of compelling purpose and close fit, that the challenged government conduct constitutes an endorsement of the favored religion or a disapproval of the
disfavored.
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(1983), and concludes that "no inquiry into potential divisiveness is called for" in this case. Ante, at--. In my view,
political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an independent test for constitutionality.
Although several of our cases have discussed political divisiveness under the entanglement prong of Lemon, see, e. g.,
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
796 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 623, we have
never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for
holding a government practice unconstitutional. Guessing
the potential for political divisiveness inherent in a government practice is simply too speculative an enterprise, in part
because the existence of the litigation, as this case illustrates,
itself may affect the political response to the government
practice. Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the Establishment Clause. Its existence may be
evidence that institutional entanglement is excessive or that
a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of religion. But the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately
on the character of the government activity that might cause
such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement.
III
The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has endorsed Christianity by its display of the creche. To answer
that question, we must examine both what Pawtucket intended to communicate in displaying the creche and what
message the City's display actually conveyed. The purpose
and effect prongs of the Lemon test represent these two aspects of the meaning of the City's action.
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both
on the intention of the speaker and on the "objective" meaning of the statement in the community. Some listeners need
not rely solely on the words themselves in discerning the
speaker's intent: they can judge the intent by, for example,
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examining the context of the statement or asking questions of
the speaker. Other listeners do not have or will not seek access to such evidence of intent. They will rely instead on the
words themselves; for them the message actually conveyed
may be something not actually intended. If the audience is
large, as it always is when government "speaks" by word or
deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a
message determined by the "objective" content of the statement, and some portion will inevitably receive the intended
message. Examination of both the subjective and the objective components of the message communicated by a government action is therefore necessary to determine whether the
action carries a forbidden meaning.
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice invalid.
A

The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a government activity have a secular purpose. That requirement
is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious purposes. In
Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980), for example, the Court
held that posting copies of the Ten Commandments in schools
violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test although instilling most of the values of the Ten Commandments and illustrating their connection to our legal system are secular objectives. See also Abington School District v. Schempp, supra,
374 U. S., at 223-224. The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon, I submit, is whether the government
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval
of religion.
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Applying that formulation to this case, I would find that
Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of endorsement of Christianity or disapproval of nonChristian religions.
The evident purpose of including the creche in the larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the creche
but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional
symbols. Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural
significance even if they also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose.
The District Court's finding that the display of the creche
had no secular purpose was based on erroneous reasoning.
The District Court believed that it should ascertain the City's
purpose in displaying the creche separate and apart from the
general purpose in setting up the display. It also found that,
because the tradition-celebrating purpose was suspect in the
court's eyes, the City's use of an unarguably religious symbol
"raises an inference" of intent to endorse. When viewed in
light of correct legal principles, the District Court's finding of
unlawful purpose was clearly erroneous.
B

Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of religion makes clear that the effect prong of the
Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation
of a government practice merely because it in fact causes,
even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion. The laws upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U. S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious, educational,
and charitable organizations), McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420 (1960) (mandatory Sunday closing law), and in
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (released time from
school for off-campus religious instruction), had such effects,
but they did not violate the Establishment Clause. What is
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect,

1
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whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community.
Pawtucket's display of its creche, I believe, does not communicate a message that the government intends to endorse
the Christian beliefs represented by the creche. Although
the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the creche,
as the district court found, is not neutralized by the setting,
the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly
understand to be the purpose of the display-as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of
a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of
that content. The display celebrates a public holiday, and no
one contends that declaration of that holiday is understood to
be an endorsement of religion. The holiday itself has very
strong secular components and traditions. Government
celebration of the holiday, which is extremely common, generally is not understood to endorse the religious content of
the holiday, just as government celebration of Thanksgiving
is not so understood. The creche is a traditional symbol of
the holiday that is very commonly displayed along with
purely secular symbols, as it was in Pawtucket.
These features combine to make the government's display
of the creche in this particular setting no more an endorsement of religion than such governmental "acknowledgments"
of religion as nonsectarian legislative prayers, government
declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of
"In God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions with
"God save the United States and this honorable court."
Those government acknowledgments of religion serve, in the
only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate
secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of
what is worthy of appreciation in society. For that reason,
and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are
not understood as conveying government approval of particu-
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lar religious beliefs. The display of the creche likewise
serves a secular purpose-celebration of a public holiday with
traditional symbols. It cannot fairly be understood to convey a message of government endorsement of religion. It is
significant in this regard that the creche display apparently
caused no political divisiveness prior to the filing of this lawsuit, although Pawtucket had incorporated the creche in its
annual Christmas display for some years. For these reasons, I conclude that Pawtucket's display of the creche does
not have the effect of communicating endorsement of Christianity.
The District Court's subsidiary findings on the effect test
are consistent with this conclusion. The court found as facts
that the creche has a religious content, that it would not be
seen as an insignificant part of the display, that its religious
content is not neutralized by the setting, that the display is
celebratory and not instructional, and that the city did not
seek to counteract any possible religious message. These
findings do not imply that the creche communicates government approval of Christianity. The District Court also
found, however, that the government was understood to
place its imprimatur on the religious content of the creche.
But whether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is not a question of simple historical fact.
Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the
question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based
classifications communicate an invidious message, in large
part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial
interpretation of social facts. The District Court's conclusion concerning the effect of Pawtucket's display of its creche
was in error as a matter of law.
IV
The city of Pawtucket is alleged to have violated the
Establishment Clause by endorsing the Christian beliefs represented by the creche included in its Christmas display.
Every government practice must be judged in its unique cir-
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cumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion, and in making that determination, courts must keep in mind both the fundamental
place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional
scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment
Clause values can be eroded. Government practices that
purport to celebrate or acknowledge events with religious
significance must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny.
Doing so here, I cannot say that the particular creche display
at issue in this case was intended to endorse or had the effect
of endorsing Christianity. I agree with the Court that the
judgment below must be reversed.

••mu Cltanttt

of tip~

•bdt•

--~ ~. crt. 21llJ'l'

CHAMIII!:It$ 0,.

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 23, 1984

Re:

82-1256 - Lynch v. Donnelly

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.§u:puntt {!fLtu:rt Ltf tqt 'J!Urittb .§tafts

'Basftinghtn. ~.

<!f.

21lp)!.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 23, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1256-Lynch v. Donnelly

Dear Bill:

Please join rre in your dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

'lbe Conference

'·
'

'

C!Jourl o-f t!rt ~nitt~ j\taf:ta
~lUllfitt.gto-n. ~. C!J. 2!1,?).!.~

.:§up-untt

CHAMBERS OF"

January 31, 1984

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKtv1UN

Re: No. 82-1256 - Lynch v. Donnelly
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your
paragraph or two of my own.

dissent.
Sincerely ,

I~

---

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

I

may

write

a

CHANGES AS MARKED;

IO

I

I~

_
STYLISTIC CHANGES THROUGHOUT

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

From:

The Chief Justice

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated:

FEB

2 l98 4

5th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1256

DENNIS LYNCH, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DANIEL DONNELLY ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[February - , 1984]

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality
from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual
Christmas display.
I
Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail merchants' association, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
erects a Christmas display as part of its observance of the
Christmas holiday season. The display is situated in a park
owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of
the shopping district. The display is essentially like those to
be found in hundreds of towns or cities across the Nationoften on public grounds-during the Christmas season. The
Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas, including,
among other things , a Santa Claus' house, reindeer pulling
Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear,
hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS ," and the creche at issue here. All
components of this display are owned by the City.
The creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or
more years, consists of the traditional figures, including the
Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and

.
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animals all ranging in height from 5" to 5'. In 1973, when
the present creche was acquired, it cost the City $1365; it
now is valued at $200.00. The erection and dismantling of
the creche costs the City about $20 per year; nominal expenses are incurred in lighting the creche. No money has
been expended on its maintenance for the past 10 years.
Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual members of the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the affiliate itself, brought this action in the
United States District Court for Rhode Island, challenging
the City's inclusion of the creche in the annual display. The
District Court held, Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150,
1178 (D. R. I. 1981), that the City's inclusion of the creche in
the display violated the Establishment Clause, which is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The
District Court held that, by including the creche in the
Christmas display, the City has "tried to endorse and promulgate [religious] beliefs," 525 F. Supp., at 1173, and that
"erection of the creche has the real and substantial effect of
affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche
represents." I d., at 1177. This "appearance of official
sponsorship," it held, "confers more than a remote and incidental benefit on Christianity." Id., at 1178. Last, although the court acknowledged the absence of administrative
entanglement, it found that excessive entanglement had been
fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including
the creche in the celebration. Id., at 1179-1180. The City
was permanently enjoined from including the creche in the
display.
A divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F. 2d 1029 (1982). We
granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1983), and we reverse.
II

A
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is,
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"to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either
[the church or the state] into the precincts of the other."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 614 (1970).
At the same time, however, the Court reminded that,
"total separation is not possible in an absolute sense.
Some relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable." Ibid.
·
An Establishment Clause challenge must be examined in
light of these principles.
The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses
as erecting a "wall" between church and state, see, e. g.,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). The
concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech
probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. 1 The
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment
Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching
it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.
No significant segment of our society and no institution
within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation
from all the other parts, much less from government. "It
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce
a regime of total separation.... " Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
760 (1973). And the Constitution does not require complete
separation; it mandates tolerance of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U. S. 306, 314, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require the
"callous indifference" that we have said was never intended
by the Establishment Clause. Z orach, supra, at 314. Indeed, we have observed that such hostility would bring us
' See R eynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878)
(quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802)) .

.t.
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into "war with our national tradition as embodied in the First
Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion."
McCollum, supra, at 211-212.
B
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment ·c lause has
comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is
found in the events of the first week of the First Session of
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress
approved the Establishment Clause, as part of the Bill of
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation
providing for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In
Marsh v. Chambers, - - U. S. - - (1983), we noted that
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Delegates to the Constitutional Convention where freedom of
speech, press and religion and antagonism toward an established church were subjects of frequent discussion. We saw
no conflict with the Establishment Clause when Nebraska
employed members of the clergy as official Legislative Chaplains to give opening prayers at sessions of the State Legislature. /d.
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Congress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the
Court's statement that the First Congress,
"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of
the greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental document," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52,
174-175 (1926)

It is clear that neither the draftsmen of the Constitution who
were Members of the First Congress, nor the Congress of
1789, saw any Establishment problem in the employment of
Congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress, a practice that has continued for nearly two centuries.
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It would be difficult to identify a more striking example of the
accommodation of religious belief intended by the Framers.

c
There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by
all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in the opinions of
this Court was this more affirmatively expressed than in the
statement of Justice Douglas for the Court in the opinion validating a program allowing release of public school students
from classes to attend off-campus religious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated the Establishment
Clause, the Court stated:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,
315 (1952).
Our history is replete with official references to the value
and need for Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers as well as contemporary leaders. Beginning in the early colonial period long before Independence, a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a
religious holiday to give thanks for the bounties of Nature as
gifts from God. President Washington and his successors
proclaimed Thanksgiving, with all its religious overtones a
day of national celebration 2 and Congress made it a National
' The day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged
President Washington to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many
and signal favours of Almighty God." See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church
and State in the United States 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964). President Washington proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to "offer[] our
prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and
beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions. . .. " 1
J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897 64 (1899).
Presidents Adams and Madison also issued thanksgiving proclamations,
as have almost all our presidents, see 3 A. Stokes, Church and State in the

..'
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Holiday. 5 U. S. C. § 6103(a) (1982). That holiday has not
lost its theme of expressing thanks for divine aid. 3
Executive orders and other official announcements of Presidents and of the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas
and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms.
And, by Acts of Congress, it has long been the practice that
federal employees are released from duties on these National
Holidays, while being paid from the same public revenues
that provide the compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate
and the House and the military services. Thus, it is clear
that government has long recognized-indeed it has subsidized-holidays with religious significance.
Other examples of religious references are found in the
statutorily prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," 36
U. S. C. § 186 (1976), which Congress and the President
mandated for our currency, see 31 U. S. C. § 324 (1976); and
in the language "One nation under God," as part of the Pledge
of Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by
United States 180-193 (1950), through the incumbent, see Proclamation
No. 4883, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,153 (1981).
3
An example is found in President Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of
Thanksgiving:
"[I]t is fitting that we give thanks with special fervor to our Heavenly
Father for the mercies we have received individually and as a nation and
for the blessings He has restored, through the victories of our arms and
those of our Allies, to His children in other lands.

***

To the end that we may bear more earnest witness to our gratitude to
Almighty God, I suggest a nationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures during the period from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas." Proclamation No.
·
2629, 9 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1944).
President Reagan and his immediate predecessors have issued similar
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5098, 48 Fed. Reg. 42,801
(1983); Proclamation No. 4803, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,633 (1980); Proclamation
No. 4333, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,003 (1974); Proclamation No. 4093, 36 Fed. Reg.
21,401 (1971); Proclamation No. 3752, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,635 (1966); Proclamation No. 3560, 28 Fed. Reg. 11,871 (1963) .
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thousands of public school children-and adults-every year.
Countless other official acknowledgments of our religious
heritage and history are readily found. 4
Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the 15th and 16th Centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith. The National Gallery
in Washington, maintained with government support, for example, has long exhibited masterpieces with religious messages, notably the Last Supper, and paintings depicting the
Birth of Christ, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, among
many others with explicit Christian themes and messages. 5
The very chamber in which oral arguments on this case were
heard is decorated with a notable and permanent-not seasonal-symbol of religion: Moses with Ten Commandments.
Congress has long provided chapels in the Capitol for religious worship and meditation.
These are but a few illustrations of the government's
acknowledgment of our religious heritage and sponsorship of
graphic manifestations of that heritage. One cannot look at
even a brief resume of those relationships without finding
that our history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs such as Justice Douglas expressed in Z orach, supra.
• Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of
Prayer each year "on which the people of the United States may turn to
God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals."
36 U. S. C. § 169h (1976). Our presidents have repeatedly issued such
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261
(1983); Proclamation No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation
No. 4379, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087, 36 Fed. Reg.
19,961 (1971); Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proclamation No. 3501, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962).
Presidential proclamations and messages have issued to commemorate
Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No. 4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077
(1981), and the Jewish High Holy Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058
(Sept. 29, 1981).
5
The National Gallery regularly exhibits more than 200 similar religious
paintings.
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Equally pervasive is the concept of tolerance of all faiths, and
all forms of religious expression, and hostility toward none.
D

This history may help explain why the Court consistently
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause. We have refused "to construe the Religion
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objective as illuminated by history." Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in
applying the Establishment Clause to religious expression is
simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court.
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental
conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to one faith-as an absolutist approach would dictatethe Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official
conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so. See Walz, supra,
at 669. This approach is consistent with what Joseph Story
wrote a century and a half ago:
"The real object of the First Amendment was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of
the national government." 3 Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 1871 (1833).
In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed,
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed paragraph
in a legal code capable of mechanical application. The purpose of the Establishment Clause "was to state an objective,
not to write a statute." Walz, supra, at 668. The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the
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Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due
process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test.
The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, [a] variable barrier
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon, supra, at 614.
In the line-drawing process we have at times found it useful to inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a
secular purpose; whether its principal or primary effect is to
advance or inhibit religion; and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon,
supra. The focus of the inquiry in this case must be on the
creche in the context of the entire Christmas display. See
e. g. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam);
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on
public classroom walls. But the Court carefully pointed out
that the Commandments were posted as a religious admonition, not "integrated into the school curriculum, where the
Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like."
449 U. S., at 42. Similarly, in Abingdon, although the Court
struck down the practices in two states requiring daily Bible
readings in public schools, it specifically noted that nothing in
the Court's holding was intended to "indicat[e] that such
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively
as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected
consistently with the First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225.
Here the District Court found that the inclusion of the
creche had no secular purpose, and in so doing it rejected the
City's claim that its reasons for including the creche were essentially the same as its reason for sponsoring the display as
a whole. The City's purposes are broad and general. In
part it seeks to attract people to the downtown commercial
area in a continuing effort to promote retail sales for the merchants. At the same time it goes beyond the commercial as-
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pect and seeks to engender a friendly community spirit for
the celebration of the Holiday, perhaps diverting focus from
less pleasant events.
The Court has invoked the Establishment Clause to invalidate legislation or governmental action on the ground that
secular purpose was lacking, but it has done this only when
there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated by religious considerations. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968);
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Even where the benefit to religion is substantial, as with the exemption of churches from
taxation, we saw no conflict with the Establishment Clause;
history was an important factor in the Court's holding in
Walz, supra, as history is important here.
There is insufficient evidence in this case to establish that
the inclusion of the creche was a purposeful or surreptitious
effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy
or endorsement of religion or a particular religious message.
The City, like the Congress and Presidents, has simply taken
note of a significant historical event long celebrated in the
Western world. The creche, as part of the City's celebration, merely depicts the historical origins and traditional elements of Christmas as part of the occasion that has long been
recognized as a National Holiday. It is "simply one of a
group of objects assembled to show how the American people
celebrate the holiday season surrounding Christmas." See
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F. 2d 944, 949 (CADC 1970); see also,
Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v.
City and County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo.
1981). As Chief Judge Campbell cogently observed in dissent in the Court of Appeals: "... creches and Santas in December are as typically symbolic of Christmas as turkeys and
Pilgrims in November are symbolic of Thanksgiving." 525
F. Supp., at 1037-1038.

I
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The real question is whether, taken as a whole, including
the creche, the display evidences a religious purpose violative
of the Establishment Clause and must be suppressed. On
this record we hold that the City had a secular purpose for
the challenged display.
The District Court found that the primary effect of inclusion of the creche is to advance religion. Comparisons of the
relative benefits to religion of different forms of support are
elusive and difficult to make. But to conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is to advance religion impermissibly would require that we view it as more beneficial
to or more an endorsement of religion, for example, than the
expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the country to students attending churchsponsored schools, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S.
236 (1968); 6 the expenditure of public funds for transportation of students to church-sponsored schools, Everson v.
Board of Education, supra; 7 the Federal grants for college
buildings of church-sponsored institutions of higher education
combining secular and religious education, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971); the noncategorical grants to
church-sponsored colleges and universities, Roemer v. Board
of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976); and the tax exemption
for church properties sanctioned in Walz, supra. It would
also require that we view it as more of an endorsement of religion than the Sunday closing laws upheld in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 8 the release time program
6

The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school." 392 U. S., at 244.
7
In E verson, the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is undoubtedly true that
children are helped to get to church schools," and that "some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled
to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets ... " 330 U. S.,
at 17.
8
"ln McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat

.'
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for religious training in Z orach, supra; and the legislative
prayers upheld in Marsh, supra.
We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving
from inclusion of the creche than from these benefits previously approved. What was said about the legislative prayers in Marsh, supra, at - - , and implied about the Sunday
Closing Laws in McGowan is true of the City's inclusion of
the creche: its "reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some . . . religions." See
McGowan, supra, at 442. We think this case differs from
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, - - U.S. - - (1983), and
McCollum, supra. In Grendel's Den, important governmental power had been vested in churches; in McCollum,
governmental power was employed in a way that encouraged
pupils to receive religious instruction.
The Court has made it abundantly clear that "not every
law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit
upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally
invalid." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra. Here, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to
all religions, is indirect, remote and incidental; the primary
effect of including the creche no more advances or endorses
religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of
the origins of the Holiday itself as "Christ's Mass," or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums.
The District Court found that there had been no administrative entanglement between religion and state resulting
from the City's ownership and use of the creche. 525 F.
Supp., at 1179. But it went on to hold that some political
divisiveness was engendered by this litigation. Coupled
with its finding of an impermissible sectarian purpose and effect, this persuaded the court that there was "excessive entanglement." The Court of Appeals expressly declined to
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even attend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776.
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accept the District Court's finding that inclusion of the creche
has caused political divisiveness along religious lines, and
noted that this Court has never held that the potential for political divisiveness alone was sufficient to invalidate government conduct.
Entanglement is a question of kind and degree. Here
there was no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the content of the exhibit prior to or since the City's
purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of
the creche have been necessary; and since the City owns the
creche, now valued at $200.00, the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. In many respects the display requires far less ongoing, day-to-day interaction between
church and state than religious paintings in public galleries.
There is here nothing like the continuing comprehensive administrative involvement present in Nyquist, supra; Lemon,
supra; and Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413
u. s. 472 (1973).
This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and
hence no inquiry into potential divisiveness is called for,
Mueller v. Allen,- U.S.--, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n. 11
(1983). But apart from this litigation there is no evidence of
political friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year
history of the Christmas celebration. In conflict with its
finding of divisiveness, the District Court stated that the inclusion of the creche for 40 years had been "marked by no apparent dissension" and that the display has had a "calm history." 525 F. Supp., at 1179. In any event, a litigant
cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, create the
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of
entanglement.
We are satisfied that the City's primary purpose in including the creche is secular, not sectarian, that it does not impermissibly advance religion, and that it does not create excessive entanglement between religion and government.
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A creche, like a painting, is passive; admittedly it is a reminder of the origins of Christmas. Of course it is identified
with one religious faith but no more so than the examples we
have set out from prior cases in which we found no conflict
with the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., McGowan,
supra; Marsh, supra. The creche may well have special
meaning to those whose faith includes the celebration of religious masses, but none who sense the origins of the Christmas celebration would fail to be aware of its religious implications. Even the traditional, purely secular displays extant
at Christmas, with or without a creche, would inevitably recall the religious nature of the Holiday.
It would be ironic if the inclusion of a single symbol of a
particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged in the Western world for 20 centuries, and in this
country by the people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two centuries, would so "taint" the
City's exhibit as to render it violative of the Establishment
Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol-the
creche-at the very time people are taking note of the season
with Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and other
public places, and while the Congress and Legislatures open
sessions with prayers by paid chaplains would be a stilted
over-reaction contrary to our history and our holdings. If
the presence of the creche in this display violates the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note
of Christmas are equally offensive to the Constitution.
The Court has acknowledged that the "fears and political
problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses in the 18th
century are of far less concern in the present day. Everson,
supra, 330 U. S., at 8. We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome or other powerful
religious leaders behind every public acknowledgment of the
religious faith whose symbols have long been officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of government.
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In short, any notion that these symbols of Christmas pose a
real danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched
indeed.
F
That this Court has been alert to the constitutionally expressed opposition to the establishment of religion is shown
in numerous holdings striking down statutes or programs as
violative of the Clause. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra;
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Epperson v.
Arkansas, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra; and McCollum v.
Board of Education, supra. The most recent example of
that careful scrutiny is found in the case invalidating a municipal ordinance granting to a church a virtual veto power over
the licensing of liquor establishments near a church. Larkin
v. Grendel's Den, supra. Taken together these cases abundantly demonstrate the Court's concern to protect the genuine objectives of the Establishment Clause. It is far too late
in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the Clause on the
country.
III
We hold that the challenged program of the City of Pawtucket does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 9 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
Reversed.

9
The Court of Appeals viewed Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982),
as commanding a "strict scrutiny" due to the City's ownership of the
$200.00 creche which it considers as a discrimination between Christian
and other religions. It is correct that we require strict scrutiny of a statute or practice discriminatory on its face. But we are unable to see this
display, or any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Larson any more than the hundreds, if not thousands, of religious
paintings exhibited in galleries and museums throughout the country are
discriminatory against non-Christian religions.
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NOTE: Where it is feasible , a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co. , 200 U. S. 321, 337.

mas spirit, brotherhood, peace, and let loose with their
money." See 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (R. I. 1981). The
creche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of
the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the
religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral part.
The city has its victory-but it is a Pyrrhic one indeed.
The import of the Court's decision is to encourage use of
the creche in a municipally sponsored display, a setting
where Christians feel constrained in acknowledging its symbolic meaning and non-Christians feel alienated by its presence. Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred symbol. Because
I cannot join the Court in denying either the force of our
precedents or the sacred message that is at the core of the
creche, I dissent and join JuSTICE BRENNAN's opinion.
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The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erects a Christmas display in a park
owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the city's
shopping district. The display includes, in addition to such objects as a
Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity scene, which has been part
of this annual display for 40 years or more. Respondents brought an
action in Federal District Court, challenging the inclusion of the creche
in the display on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the challenge and permanently enjoined the city from including the creche in the display.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, Pawtucket
has not violated the Establishment Clause. Pp. 3-17.
(a) The concept of a "wall" of separation between church and state is a
useful metaphor but is not an accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitution does not
require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any. Anything less would require the "callous indifference," Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314, that was never intended
by the Establishment Clause. Pp. 3-4.
(b) This Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause comports
with the contemporaneous understanding of the Framers' intent. That
neither the draftsmen of the Constitution, who were Members of the
First Congress, nor the First Congress itself, saw any establishment
problem in employing Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress is
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Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
760 (1973). Nor does the Constitutloii require complete
separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance:Of all religions, and forbids 'hostility toward any. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U. S. 306, 314, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require
the "callous indifference" we have said was never intended by
the Establishment Clause. Zorach, supra, at 314. Indeed,
we have observed, such hostility would bring us into "war
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion."
McCollum, supra, at 211-212.

LYNCH v. DONNELLY

"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of
the greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instument," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52, 174-175 (1926).

It is clear that neither the seventeen draftsmen of the Constitution who were Members of the First Congress, nor the
Congress of 1789, saw any establishment problem in the employment of congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers in
the Congress, a practice that has continued for nearly two
centuries. It would be difficult to identify a more striking
example of the accommodation of religious belief intended by
the Framers.

c

B

The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause has
comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is
found in the events of the first week of the First Session of
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress
approved the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation providing for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In
Marsh v. Chambers,-- U.S.-- (1983), we noted that
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Delegates to the Constitutional Convention where freedom of
speech, press and religion and antagonism toward an established church were subjects of frequent discussion. We saw
no conflict with the Establishment Clause when Nebraska
employed members of the clergy as official Legislative Chaplains to give opening prayers at sessions of the state legislature. I d., at - - .
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Congress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the
Court's emphasis that the First Congress

5

There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by
all three bran~verilment of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in our opinions was
this more affirmatively expressed than in Justice Douglas'
opinion for the Court validating a program allowing release of
public school students from classes to attend off-campus religious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated
the Establishment Clause, the Court asserted pointedly:
''We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 313.
See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203,
213 (1963).

Our history is replete with official references to the value
and invoca1ion of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary
leaders. Beginning in the early colonial period long before
Independence, a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to give thanks for the bounties of Nature as
gifts from God. President Washington and his successors
proclaimed Thanksgiving, with all its religious overtones, a
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LYNCH v. DONNELLY

8

Presidents have repeatedly issued such Proclamations. 5
Presidential Proclamations and messages have also issued to
commemorate Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No.
4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077 (1981), and the Jewish High Holy
Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058 (Sept. 29, 1981).
One cannot look at even this brief resume without finding
that our history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs such as are found in Zorach, supra. Equally pervasive
is the evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of
religious expression, and hostility toward none. Through
this accommodation, as Justice Douglas observed, governmental action has "follow[ed] the best of our traditions" and
"respect[ed] the religious nature of our people." !d., at 314.

III
This history may help explain why the Court consistently
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause. We have refused "to construe the Religion
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objective as illuminated by history." Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in
applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been
uniformly rejected by the Court.
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental
conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith-as an absolutist
approach would dictate-the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in
reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to
5

See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261 (1983); Proclamation No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation No. 4379, 40 Fed.
Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,961 (1971);
Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proclamation No. 3501,
27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962).
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do so. See Walz, supra, at 669. Joseph Story wrote a century and a half ago:
"The real object of the [First] Amendment was ... to
prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of
the national government." 3 Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 728 (1833).
In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed,
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed provision in
a legal code capable of ready application. The purpose of the
Establishment Clause "was to state an objective, not to write
a statute." Walz, supra, at 668. The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the Clause can no
more be straight and unwavering than due process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test. The Clause erects
a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all
the circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon,
supra, at 614.
In ~h
line-drawing process we have often found it useful to
nether the challenged law or conduct has a secular ~
inquL
purpo , hether it~incipal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, a~hether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon, supra. Buty /
we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.
See e. g. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 677-678 (1971);
Nyquist, supra, 413 U. S., at 773. In two cases, the Court
did not even apply the Lemon "test." We did not, for example, consider that analysis relevant in Marsh, supra. Nor
did we find Lemon useful in Lqrson v. V ak._nt~ U. S. 228
(1982), where there was substantial evidence of overt discrimination against a particular church.
In this case, the focus of our inquiry must be on the creche
in the context of the Christmas season. See, e. g., Stone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Abington School
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District v. Schempp, supra. In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state statute requiring the posting of a copy of the
Ten Commandments on public classroom walls. But the
Court carefully pointed out that the Commandments were
posted purely as a religious admonition, not "integrated into
the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally
be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like." 449 U. S., at 42.
Similarly, in Abington, although the Court struck down the
practices in two States requiring daily Bible readings in public schools, it specifically noted that nothing in the Court's
holding was intended to "indicat[e] that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently
with the First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225. Focus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment
Clause.
The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but
only when it has concluded there was no question that the
statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41;
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 107-109 (1968); Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 223-224; Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 424-425 (1962). Even where the benefits to religion were substantial, as in Everson, supra; Board
of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), Walz, supra,
and Tilton, supra, we saw a secular purpose and no conflict
with the Establishment Clause. Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, 459 U. S. 116 (1983).
The District Court inferred from the religious nature of the
creche that the City has no secular purpose for the display.
In so doing, it rejected the City's claim that its reasons for
including the creche are essentially the same as its reasons
for sponsoring the display as a whole. The District Court

plainly erred by focusing almost exclusively on the creche.
When viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday
season, it is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient
evidence to establish that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle
governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. In
a pluralistic society a variety of motives and purposes are implicated. The City, like the Congresses and Presidents,
however, has principally taken note of a significant historical
religious event long celebrated in the Western World. The
creche in the display depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday. See
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F. 2d 944 (CADC 1970); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and
County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D Colo. 1981).
The narrow question is whether there is a secular purpose
for PawtlicKenraisp1ay of the creche. The dtsplay 1s sponsored by the City to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the
origins of that Holiday. These are legitimate secular purposes. 6 The District Court's inferenc~ drawn from the religious nature of the creche, that the City has no secular purpose was, on this record, clearly erroneous. 7
The District Court found that the primary effect of including the creche is to confer a substantial and impermissible
benefit on religion in general and on the Christian faith in .
particular. Comparisons of the relative benefits to religion
of different forms of governmental support are elusive and

10

6
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The City contends that the purposes of the display are "exclusively
secular." We hold only that Pawtucket has a secular purpose for its display, which is all that Lemon requires. Were the test that the government must have "exclusively secular" objectives, much of the conduct and
legislation this Court has approved in the past would have been
invalidated.
7
JusTICE BRENNAN argues that the City's objectives could have been
achieved without including.the creche in the display, post, at 6. True or
not, that is irrelevant. The question is whether the display of the creche
violates the Establishment Clause.
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difficult to make. But to conclude that the primary effect of
including the creche is to advance religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause would require that we view it as more
beneficial to and more an endorsement of religion, for example, than expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the country to students attending
church-sponsored schools, Board of Education v. Allen,
supra; 8 expenditure of public funds for transportation Of stu-'
dents to church-sponsored schools, Everson v. Board of Education, supra; 9 federal grants for conegebuildings of churchsponsored institutions of higher education combining secular
and religious education, .;Tilton, supra; 10 noncategorical
grants to church-sponsored COileges and universities, Roemer
v. Board of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976); and the tax
exemptions for church properties sanctioned in Walz, supra.
It would also require that we view it as more o~ndorse
ment of religion than the Sunday Closing Laws upheld in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 11 the release
timeprogram for religious training in Z orach, supra; and the
legislative prayers upheld in Marsh, supra.
We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving
from inclusion of the creche than from these benefits and endorsements previously held not violative of the Establish-

ment Clause. What was said about the legislative prayers in
Marsh, supra, at - - , and implied about the Sunday Closing
Laws in McGowan is true of the City's inclusion of the creche:
its "reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some ... religions." See McGowan,
supra, at 442.
This case differs significantly from Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, supra, and McCollum, supra, where religion was substantially aided. In Grendel's Den, important governmental
power-a licensing veto authority-had been vested in
churches. In McCollum, government had made religious instruction available in public school classrooms; the State had
not only used the public school buildings for the teaching of
religion, it had "afford[ed] sectarian groups an invaluable aid
. .. [by] provid[ing] pupils for their religious classes through
use of the State's compulsory public school machinery." 333
U. S., at 212. No comparable benefit to religion is discernible here.
The dissent asserts some observers may perceive that the
City has aligned itself with the Christian faith by including a
Christian symbol in its display and that this serves to advance religion. We can assume, arguendo, that the display
advances religion in a sense; but our precedents plainly contemplate that on occasion some advancement of religion will
result from governmental action. The Court has made it
abundantly clear, however, that "not every law that confers
an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon [religion] is,
for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." Nyquist,
supra, at 771; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S:-263 ~273
(1981). Here, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to
all religions, is indirect, remote and incidental; display of the
creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion
than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as "Christ's Mass," or the exhibition
of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally
supported museums.

8
The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school. .. ." 392 U. S., at

244.

• In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is undoubtedly true that
children are helped to get to church schools," and that "some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled
to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets ... " 330 U. S.,
at 17.
'"We recognized in Tilton that the construction grants "surely aid[ed]"
the institutions that received them. 403 U.S., at 679.
11
"In McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even attend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776.
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opposite message. See generally Abington School District
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1970), as a
to detecting these two forms of unconstitutional government action. 1 It has never been entirely clear, however,
"? how the three parts of the test relate to the principles en• shrined in the Establishment Clause. Focusing on institu7 tiona! entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of re.. ligion clarifies the Lemon teS'tas atiarurtyl:Ical device.

II
In this case, as even the District Court found, there is no
institutional entanglement. Nevertheless, the appellees
contend that the political divisiveness caused by Pawtucket's
display of its creche violates the excessive-entanglement
prong of the Lemon test. The Court's opinion follows the
suggestion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. - - , - - , n: 11
1

The Court wrote in Lemon v. Kurtzman that a statute must pass three
tests to withstand Establishment Clause challenge.
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 403 U. S., at 612-613 (citations omitted).
Though phrased as a uniformly applicable test for constitutionality, this
three-part test "provides 'no more than (a] helpful signpost' in dealing with
Establishment Clause challenges." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. - - , - (1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)).
Moreover, the Court has held that a statute or practice that plainly embodies an intentional discrimination among religions must be closely fitted
to a compelling state purpose in order to survive constitutional challenge.
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982). As the Court's opinion observes, ante, at 17, n. 13, this case does not involve such discrimination.
The Larson standard, I believe, may be assimilated to the Lemon test in
the clarified version I propose. Plain intentional discrimination should
give rise to a presumption, which may be overcome by a showing of compelling purpose and close fit, that the challenged government conduct constitutes an endorsement of the favored religion or a disapproval of the
disfavored.
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(1983), and concludes that "no inquiry into potential political
divisiveness is even called for" in this case. Ante, at 14. In
my view, political divisiveness along religious lines should not
be an independent test of constitutionality.
Although several of our cases have discussed political divisiveness under the entanglement prong of Lemon, see, e. g.,
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
796 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 623, we have "l
never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for
holding a government practice unconstitutional. Guessing
the potential for political divisiveness inherent in a government practice is simply too speculative an enterprise, in part
because the existence of the litigation, as this case illustrates,
itself may affect the political response to the government
practice. Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil ad- {
dressed by the Establishment Clause. Its existence may be
evidence that institutional entanglement is excessive or that
a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of religion. But the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately
on the character of the government activity that might cause
such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself. The entan- /
glement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to insti- }
tutional entanglement.
III
The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has endorsed Christianity by its display of the creche. To answer
that question, we must examine both what Pawtucket intended to communicate in displaying the creche and what
message the City's display actually conveyed. The purpose
and effect prongs of the Lemon test represent these two aspects of the meaning of the City's action.
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both
on the intention of the speaker and on the "objective" meaning of the statement in the community. Some listeners need
not rely solely on the words themselves in discerning the
speaker's intent: they can judge the intent by, for example,
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examining the context of the statement or asking questions of
the speaker. Other listeners do not have or will not seek access to such evidence of intent. They will rely instead on the
words themselves; for them the message actually conveyed
may be something not actually intended. If the audience is
large, as it always is when government "speaks" by word or
deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a
message determined by the "objective" content of the statement, and some portion will inevitably receive the intended
message. Examination of both the subjective and the objective components of the message communicated by a government action is therefore necessary to determine whether the
action carries a forbidden meaning.
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice invalid.
A

Applying that formulation to this case, I would find that
Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of endorsement of Christianity or disapproval of non Christian religions.
The evident purpose of including the creche in the larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the creche
but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional
symbols. Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural
significance even if they also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose.
The District Court's finding that the display of the creche
had no secular purpose was based on erroneous reasoning.
The District Court believed that it should ascertain the City's
purpose in displaying the creche separate and apart from the
general purpose in setting up the display. It also found that,
because the tradition-celebrating purpose was suspect in the
court's eyes, the City's use of an unarguably religious symbol
"raises an inference" of intent to endorse. When viewed in
light of correct legal principles, the District Court's finding of
unlawful purpose was clearly erroneous.

The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a government activity have a secular purpose. That requirement
~ is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secu,..--J
lar purpose, however dominated by religious purposes. In
\
Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980), for example, the Court
held that posting copies of the Ten Commandments in schools
violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test, yet the State
plainly had some secular objectives, such as instilling most of
the values of the Ten Commandments and illustrating their
connection to our legal system, but see id., at 41. See also
Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, 374 U. S., at
223-224. The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of
Lemon, I submit, is whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.

t
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B

Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of religion makes clear that the effect prong of the
Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation
of a government practice merely because it in fact causes,
even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion. The laws upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U. S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious, educational,
and charitable organizations), in McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420 (1960) (mandatory Sunday closing law), and in
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (released time from
school for off-campus religious instruction), had such effects,
but they did not violate the Establishment Clause. What is
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect,

